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ABSTRACT 
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MALINGERING IN LEGAL 
CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 
 
by 
 
Renee Marie Kadlubek 
 
 
Dr. W. Paul Jones, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Educational Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to put people with 
mental retardation to death for capital crimes (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  Justice Scalia 
dissented, suggesting that mental retardation is a condition easy to feign. The current 
study examined whether participants provided with the definition of mental retardation 
and adaptive behavior (“informed malingering group”) are any better at malingering 
having mental retardation than participants not provided with the definitions 
(“malingering group”).  Three groups of participants participated in this study:  the 
control group, the malingering group, and the informed malingering group. All 
participants completed an intellectual assessment and two adaptive behavior assessments. 
Results revealed that there were no statistically significant differences in performance on 
any of the assessments between the two malingering conditions, and both groups over 
exaggerated their deficits to an extent that their malingering attempts were conspicuous. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that people with mental 
retardation are not eligible to receive capital punishment for crimes (Atkins v. Virginia, 
2002).  This precedent, established in the case Atkins v. Virginia, was based on the 
reasoning that capital punishment for people with mental retardation is a cruel and 
unusual punishment, and therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). The Atkins decision was far from 
unanimous.  Five Justices agreed with this decision and four Justices dissented.  Justice 
Scalia wrote one of the dissenting opinions.  One of his most cited statements in his 
dissent expressed his belief that all it takes is for a person to read the definition of mental 
retardation to see that the symptoms are easily feigned.   
Feigning is extensively described in psychological and forensic literature, and 
there are many types of feigning.  The type of feigning Justice Scalia describes in his 
could more accurately be called “malingering.”  The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition-TR (DSM-IV-TR) defines malingering as, “The 
intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological 
symptoms, motivated by external incentives” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2000, p. 739).  In the example presented by Justice Scalia, a criminal otherwise eligible 
for capital punishment may produce false physical or psychological symptoms consistent 
with mental retardation for the purpose of receiving the external incentive of avoiding 
capital punishment.   
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On the surface, Justice Scalia’s concern seems to be reasonable. However, given 
the sophistication of modern psychological assessments, the various criteria required in 
the mental retardation diagnosis, and the empirical techniques employed by forensic 
examiners to detect malingering, his statement may grossly underestimate the current 
state of affairs in psychological assessment.  The current study was conducted to 
determine whether it is as easy as Justice Scalia suggests for someone to malinger mental 
retardation.  More specifically, this study seeks to determine whether adults provided 
with a definition of mental retardation are better able to malinger having this condition 
than adults who are not provided with the definition. 
Background of the Study 
In 2002, Atkins v. Virginia held that capital punishment for people with mental 
retardation violates the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment protecting individuals from 
cruel and unusual punishment (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  That portion of the Eighth 
Amendment is binding in federal, state, and local courts (Robinson v. California, 1962).  
In essence, federal and state criminals otherwise eligible to receive capital punishment 
would no longer be eligible for such punishment if shown to have mental retardation.  
The relevant, and most often cited, dissenting opinion in Atkins was articulated by Justice 
Antonin Scalia.  He stated: 
The newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the other in 
turning the process of capital trial into a game.  One need only read the definitions 
of mental retardation adopted by the American Association of Mental Retardation 
and the American Psychiatric Association to realize that the symptoms of this 
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condition can be readily feigned.  And whereas the capital defendant who feigns 
insanity risks commitment to a mental institution until he can be cured, Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 379, and n. 20 (1983), the capital defendant who 
feigns mental retardation risks nothing at all (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 353). 
Though the Atkins decision was seen as advancement for human rights, it 
presented a unique challenge to forensic psychologists and the criminal justice system.  
Atkins v. Virginia created more of an impetus for convicted criminals eligible to receive 
the death penalty to seek a diagnosis of mental retardation in order to avoid this 
punishment.  Though forensic psychologists have always been faced with a high 
possibility of malingering among convicted criminals, the motivation for a criminal to 
receive the mental retardation diagnosis increased significantly. While taking malingering 
into account, forensic psychologists also have to keep in mind that the forensic 
population has been shown to have a higher percentage of individuals with actual 
cognitive deficits in the penal system compared to the general population (Tasse, 2009). 
After Atkins was decided, forensic psychologists were given the heavy burden of 
attempting to distinguish between which capital defendants and convicts actually had 
mental retardation, and which were attempting to malinger having the condition to avoid 
capital punishment.  
Post-Atkins, psychological evaluations conducted for the purpose of ruling in, or 
ruling out, the presence of mental retardation became vital to the lives of many awaiting 
execution.  The requests for such evaluations did increase as a result of the Atkins ruling, 
and came to be known as “Atkins claims” (Blume, Johnson, & Seeds, 2009).  In addition 
to issues of potential malingering, States were now faced with the responsibility of 
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addressing other substantive and procedural issues related to the Atkins decision. State 
statutes had to reflect a cohesive and streamlined definition of mental retardation so as to 
be in full compliance with the new constitutional mandate (Ellis, 2002).  States also had 
to enact legislation to address at what point in the adjudicative process the Atkins claim 
would be brought in, and whether a judge or jury would ultimately decide if the Atkins 
claim met the statutory standard (Ellis, 2002).   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to determine the merit behind Justice Scalia’s 
assertion that the symptoms of mental retardation are easily feigned.  This study 
specifically sought to investigate whether laypersons provided with the APA definition of 
mental retardation are better able to malinger having the condition than laypersons not 
provided with the definition.  The types of assessment tools used in this study are 
psychometrically sound assessment tools designed to measure the two main constructs 
related to mental retardation.  These constructs are intelligence and adaptive behavior. 
The assessments related to each construct yield scores that can be easily compared to 
determine statistical significance between groups in different conditions.   Though this 
study will compare performance of each group on intelligence assessments, specific focus 
will be on the adaptive behavior prong of the mental retardation assessment.   
Statement of the Problem 
 Definitions of mental retardation vary slightly among the leading professional 
associations. However, there are typically three well established prongs recognized as 
essential to a mental retardation diagnosis. First, individuals with mental retardation have 
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significant cognitive, or intellectual, deficits. Second, individuals with mental retardation 
have significant deficits in adaptive behaviors.  Third, mental retardation has an onset 
prior to age 18 (APA, 2000).  The APA classifies mental retardation based on four 
different categories depending on level of severity as determined by standard scores:  
People with mild mental retardation have intellectual quotient (IQ) standard scores 
between 55 and 70.  People with moderate mental retardation have IQ scores between 40 
and 54. People with severe mental retardation have IQ scores between 25 and 39, and 
profound mental retardation is established with IQ scores below 20 (APA, 2000).  
If a person has not been diagnosed as having mental retardation prior to age 18, 
such a diagnosis is not precluded. Rather, the diagnosis requires that the the age of onset 
of the symptoms occur prior to age 18, not that the diagnosis itself had been recognized 
prior to the age of 18.  Therefore, an initial diagnosis of mental retardation after the age 
of 18 is acceptable as long as the characteristics manifested prior to the age of 18. The 
other two characteristics of mental retardation can be more directly examined at any age.  
For this reason, capital defendants attempting to malinger having mental retardation only 
have control over the portions of the diagnosis that are directly tested: intelligence and 
adaptive behavior (APA, 2000).   
Courts may assume that a person over the age of 18 who does not have a 
diagnosis of mental retardation does not actually have the condition. This assumption is 
not correct.  Unlike the more severe forms of mental retardation, people with mild mental 
retardation usually do not have physical appearance differences associated with the 
condition and they often do not clearly stand out in society (Gresham, 2009).  In the 
Atkins context, the question is almost exclusively related to whether the capital defendant 
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has mild mental retardation as opposed to the more severe forms of the disability 
(Gresham, 2009). Individuals with mild mental retardation show academic deficits in 
school, but such deficits are not always identified as being the result of mental 
retardation. Rather, sometimes these individuals are misidentified as having another 
disability, such as learning disabilities, and sometimes these individuals are never 
evaluated for special education services at all (Gresham, 2009). For these reasons, it is 
not safe to assume that adults who would actually legitimately meet the diagnostic 
criteria for mental retardation have already been identified as having the condition. 
Similarly, it is not safe to assume that an adult who presents as having mental retardation 
in the Atkins context is necessarily malingering having the condition. 
There are various instruments specifically designed to help examiners detect 
malingering. The ability to detect deception, including malingering, is a skill necessary 
for any forensic evaluator to possess (Mossman, 2003).  This is especially the case with 
Atkins evaluations, at least to the extent that the diagnostic criteria can be assessed.  Two 
of the three criteria, intelligence and adaptive behavior, can be assessed at any time in a 
person’s life.  Intelligence, as a theoretical construct, and how to practically assess 
intelligence has been researched extensively for over 100 years (Hagen, 2007). 
Intelligence, IQ, and general ability are concepts that are embedded in everyday 
knowledge and vocabulary. Adaptive behavior, on the other hand, is not as commonly 
understood by laymen.  
Adaptive behavior has been conceptualized and studied in clinical contexts almost 
as long as intelligence, and adaptive behavior has often been seen as being almost 
synonymous with intelligence (Kanaya & Ceci, 2007).  However, very few studies have 
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specifically examined how to detect deception on adaptive behavior assessments (Doane 
& Salekin, 2009). On the surface, it may appear to be easy for Atkins claimants to 
malinger having adaptive behavior deficits, particularly if they have access to the 
definition of what adaptive behavior is. In addition, most mainstream adaptive behavior 
assessments do not have built-in validity indicators to detect whether the respondent is 
falsifying their responses in an attempt to depress the adaptive behavior scores in hopes 
of a successful Atkins claim. 
A closer look at what is required to obtain adaptive behavior scores that would be 
indicative of mild mental retardation reveals it may be quite difficult.  Like intelligence 
assessments, adaptive behavior assessments are sophisticated and are generally have 
multi-age norms. In order for a respondent to successfully falsify responses that would 
yield scores in the mildly mentally retarded range, the respondent would need access to 
specific information.  The number of correct items needed to obtain specific standard 
scores varies with the respondent’s age.  For this reason, a respondent would most likely 
need access to the specific assessment tool’s norms table.  In addition, the respondent 
would have to know how to translate the raw scores to standard scores, and what these 
different scores mean.  Respondents attempting to deflate their scores to appear as though 
they had mental retardation would also need to understand what types of response 
patterns are typical for people with the actual condition. Without understanding typical 
response patterns of people with mild mental retardation, a malingerer runs the risk of 
having their deception identified by forensic psychologists who are trained to detect 
atypical response patterns. Overall, it is unclear how difficult it is to successfully 
malinger having adaptive behavior deficits. What is clear is that a crucial piece to 
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understanding how well capital defendants are able to maligner having mental retardation 
is to determine how well they are able to malinger having adaptive behavior deficits.  
Significance of the Problem 
Though time has brought increasing awareness to what mental retardation is, mild 
mental retardation, in particular, continues to be misunderstood in schools, courts, and the 
community.  Whereas more severe types of mental retardation are associated with 
differences in physical appearance, people with mild mental retardation often do not have 
any abnormalities in terms of physical appearance (Gresham, 2009). In the criminal 
context, people with mental retardation are at a disadvantage compared to their non-
disabled counterparts. Prior to arrest, people with mental retardation make false 
confessions more frequently than people without mental retardation, and their ability to 
retell events accurately is hindered (Everington & Fulero, 1999; Gresham, 2009).  People 
with mental retardation tend to display a relatively flat affect and a diminished 
understanding of judicial proceedings they may be involved in (American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [AAIDD], 2010).  Such nonverbal cues can 
easily be misinterpreted by jurors and judges as representing a lack of remorse rather than 
a lack of understanding about the proceedings. 
Capital defendants who actually have mental retardation, but who have not yet 
been diagnosed as having it, need to be evaluated accurately to ensure their constitutional 
rights are protected under Atkins.  The main concern, as expressed by Justice Scalia, is 
that defendants making Atkins claims might attempt malinger to avoid harsh judgments 
and punishments.  In forensic contexts, malingering is a common threat to the validity of 
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the results. For this reason, it is essential that forensic evaluators understand whether 
assessments used to diagnose mental retardation are susceptible to such feigning. Since 
Atkins v. Virginia was decided, there has been an increase in the number of capital 
defendants and convicts requesting evaluations under these circumstances, research is 
needed to determine whether mental retardation is a condition that is easily feigned 
(Tasse, 2009).   
Nature of the Study 
 In order to answer the research questions posed in this study, participants were 
recruited from two major public universities in Nevada.  The participants received one of 
three sets of instructions.  One group served as a control group in which participants were 
asked to put forth their best efforts when completing the assessments provide to them.  
Control group partcipants were asked to complete the assessments honestly. Another 
group of participants, referred to as the “malingering group”, was given a brief written 
explanation of the Atkins decision and the role psychological testing has on determining 
whether a capital defendant has mental retardation. The malingering group was provided 
with general instructions to complete the assessments they were given in a manner that 
made it appear as though they have mental retardation.  However, they were not provided 
with any further information, such as the specific characteristics of the condition.  The 
final group, referred to as the “informed-malingering group”, was given all of the 
information the malingering group received, along with the APA definitions of mental 
retardation and adaptive functioning.   
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Research Questions 
 Throughout his dissenting statement in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Scalia suggested 
that all it takes is for a person to read the definition of mental retardation to see that the 
symptoms are easily feigned.  This study sought to determine whether Justice Scalia’s 
statement was warranted and whether empirical evidence supports his claims. In a 
general sense, the purpose of this study was to answer the following questions: Are the 
symptoms that make up a mental retardation diagnosis easy to feign as Justice Scalia 
suggested?  Also, are individuals provided with a definition of mental retardation more 
effective at malingering having the condition than individuals not provided with the 
definition?  More specifically, this study sought to answer the following questions: 
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on verbal, nonverbal, and total 
intelligence scores obtained from the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Second 
Edition (SILS-2)?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on total adaptive behavior scores 
obtained from the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition 
(ABAS-II)?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on adaptive behavior scores obtained 
from the Behavior Assessment System for Children Self-Report, Second Edition 
(BASC-2)? 
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 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group with regards to how well participants 
are able to provide responses on the BASC-2 that go undetected by the built-in 
validity scales?   
Hypothesis 
Ten hypotheses were tested to address the four general research questions: 
1. There will be a statistically significant difference in SILS-2 intelligence test 
scores between the control group and the combined malingering groups. 
2. The difference between SILS-2 intelligence test scores of the malingering and the 
informed-malingering groups will not be statistically significant.   
3. There will be a statistically significant difference in the ABAS-II GAC test scores 
between the control group and the combined malingering groups. 
4. The difference between the ABAS-II GAC test scores of the malingering and the 
informed-malingering groups will not be statistically significant. 
5. There will be a statistically significant difference in the BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment test scores between the control group and the combined malingering 
groups. 
6. The difference between the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment test scores of the 
malingering and the informed-malingering groups will not be statistically 
significant. 
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7. There will be a statistically significant difference in the number of “acceptable” 
ratings on the BASC-2 validity indicators between the control group and the 
combined malingering groups.  
8. The difference in the number of “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 validity 
indicators test scores of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups will 
not be statistically significant. 
9. There will be no statistically significant difference in performance of the 
participants assigned to a malingering condition on measures in this study 
contingent on prior diagnostic knowledge about mental retardation. 
10. There will be no statistically significant difference between performance of the 
participants assigned to a malingering condition on measures in this study 
contingent on prior personal knowledge or experience with persons with mental 
retardation. 
Definition of Terms 
 In order to provide a consistent framework around which a discussion of the 
recurring themes of the study can be addressed, the following definitions are provided: 
Adaptive Behavior:  “The degree to which the individual is able to function and maintain 
him- or herself independently and the degree to which he or she meets satisfactorily the 
culturally imposed demands of personal and social responsibility” (Herber, 1961, p. 61).   
Atkins Claim: A claim made by a defendant up for capital punishment that he/she may 
have mental retardation (Blume, Johnson, & Seeds, 2009). 
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Feigning:  “The deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of psychological or physical 
symptoms without any assumptions about its goals” (Rogers, 2003, p. 6). 
Mental Retardation:  “A disorder, with onset before 18 years, characterized by 
significantly sub average intellectual functioning and concurrent deficits or impairments 
in present adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community 
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety,” 
(APA, 2000). 
Malingering: “The intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” (APA, 2000, p. 739). 
For the purposes of this study, there will be a variety of terms used synonymously 
with other related terms commonly found in the empirical literature.  For instance, 
“mental retardation” will be used synonymously with “cognitive impairment” and 
“intellectual disability”.  Various professional descriptions will be used to identify 
clinicians who conduct Atkins’ claims.  The terms “forensic psychologist”, “evaluator”, 
and “examiner” are all intended to represent people who perform basically the same 
professional functions in relation to Atkins claims.  Similarly, the descriptions of the 
researcher will be referred to as “evaluator”, “examiner”, and “researcher”.  “Adaptive 
behavior” and “adaptive functioning” are also used synonymously.  Finally, since Atkins 
claims are brought at different times in the adjudicative process depending on various 
factors, such claimants will be referred to as “capital defendants”, “capital convicts”, and 
“Atkins claimants”.  
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Assumptions 
 This study makes a number of assumptions.  First, it is assumed that the 
measurements used in this study accurately measure the constructs they are intended to 
measure.  Second, it is assumed that the participants do not have an extensive and 
sophisticated knowledge about mental retardation prior to participating in the study.  
Third, it is assumed that the participants do not know the specific purpose of this study. 
Fourth, it is assumed that the participants in the control group will complete the 
assessments as instructed by exerting adequate attention and effort towards the tasks.  
Finally, it is assumed that the participants in the malingering group and the informed-
malingering group are actually completing the assessments in an effort to successfully 
malinger having mental retardation as they are instructed to do.   
Limitations  
 The results of this study are intended to be an initial examination of the research 
questions proposed.  The assessments used in this study are intended to represent the 
same types of assessments used in an actual evaluation examining mental retardation. 
However, the actual assessments used in a comprehensive Atkins evaluation would likely 
include a more comprehensive cognitive assessment, multiple raters for the adaptive 
behavior assessment, and a standardized tool to address the potential of malingering 
(Bonnie, 2004).  Given the present study’s time and resource limitations, it was not 
feasible to conduct a comprehensive forensic evaluation with each participant similar to 
what an actual Atkins evaluation entails. Despite this limitation, the information obtained 
from the results of the current study are expected to provide answers to the research 
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questions posed. The information will also provide a preliminary foundation from which 
future research can be expanded upon. 
The participants in this study all had some level of college education, were living 
in Nevada at the time of their participation, and were at least 18 years of age. The sample 
recruited for the present research was bound by limits inherent in the nature of the 
research.  Though this sample provided various benefits, such as accessibility, 
convenience, and fluent abilities to read and comprehend the materials they were 
provided, the sample is not representative of a forensic population.  Though obtaining 
participants consisting of prison inmates would have been ideal to answer the research 
questions posed in this study, prison inmates are at an immediate power disadvantage 
compared to non-inmates just by being in prison. Their susceptibility to being exploited 
for research purposes is high, and, therefore, the likelihood that they could give 
meaningful consent to participate in research is low. Given these ethical and logistical 
constraints, accessing such participants for the purpose of the current study were not 
feasible or desirable.  
Implications for School Psychology 
 Individuals identified as having mental retardation are usually evaluated through 
local, state, or federal agencies.  Physical, communicative, and behavioral characteristics 
associated with moderate, severe, and profound levels of mental retardation tend to be so 
salient and abnormal that people with these conditions are often identified prior to 
reaching elementary school (Gresham, 2009). However, since characteristics of mild 
mental retardation tend to be more subtle than the other three types of mental retardation, 
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children with these deficits are usually not identified until they enter school (Gresham, 
2009).  Frequently, individuals with mild mental retardation are misidentified as having 
other disabling conditions, such as learning disabilities, or sometimes they are not 
identified as having any disabling conditions at all (Gresham, 2009; Kanaya & Ceci, 
2007). 
School psychologists are charged with conducting comprehensive psycho-
educational evaluations for children who are suspected of having disabilities, including 
mental retardation. In such cases, it is often up to school psychologists to recognize the 
unique deficits that accompany this disability. Some studies have shown that it is not 
uncommon for children with intelligence scores indicative of mild mental retardation to 
be found eligible to receive special education services under a different eligibility 
category, such as specific learning disability (Gresham, 2009).  Some researchers caution 
the practice of relying too heavily on IQ scores to make eligibility determinations, 
particularly because of concerns regarding overrepresentation of minorities being labeled 
as having mental retardation (Hagen, 2007). However, failing to utilize IQ tests for 
minorities, or failure to identify mental retardation while a student is below the age of 18 
years, can prove to be problematic if the individual does legitimately have mental 
retardation (Gresham, 2009; Kanaya & Ceci, 2007). 
One of the reasons why it is important to correctly evaluate, identify, and 
document students who may be presenting with these characteristics of mental retardation 
in school has to do with the requirement that an adult cannot be found to have mental 
retardation unless the symptoms manifested prior to the age of 18 years. In Atkins cases, 
a capital defendant may present as having deficits in intelligence and adaptive behavior 
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consistent with mild mental retardation, but, unless the defendant can show these 
symptoms manifested prior to the age of 18 years, an Atkins claim will likely fail.  Since 
2002, courts have frequently looked to school records in such cases to determine whether 
the Atkins claimants can meet this diagnostic requirement. 
An example of how important school records are in connection with Atkins 
claims is highlighted by the case Ybarra v. State of Nevada (2011). Robert Ybarra, Jr. 
was originally sentenced to death in 1981 for the murder of Nancy Griffith.  Griffith was 
found in the desert outside of Ely, Nevada, having been beaten, raped and set on fire by 
Ybarra.  Griffith was barely alive when she was found, but died a day later after having 
been admitted to the hospital.  Ybarra was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree 
kidnapping, battery with intent to commit sexual assault, and sexual assault.  He was 
sentenced to death after the jury determined there were no mitigating circumstances to 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances associated with the murder (Ybarra v. State of 
Nevada, 2011). 
 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Atkins, Ybarra petitioned the court to set 
aside his sentence of death on the grounds that he was mentally retarded.  The District 
Court denied Ybarra’s request, finding that Ybarra was not mentally retarded under 
Nevada’s standard (Ybarra v. Nevada, 2011). Nevada’s standard requires that, in order to 
be found ineligible for capital punishment under Atkins, the capital convict petitioning the 
court must exhibit “significant sub-average general intellectual functioning which exists 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental 
period.”  NRS 174.098(7).  The court denied Ybarra’s request despite the fact that Ybarra 
presented the testimony of two experts, both of which concluded that Ybarra’s IQ was 
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within the mild to borderline range of mental retardation (Ybarra v. State of Nevada, 
2011)   
 In concluding that Ybarra was not mentally retarded, the district court relied. in 
part, on his school records to discount the testimony of Ybarra’s experts.  Ybarra’s school 
records, along with his military and mental health records, provided what the Supreme 
Court referred to as “generalized assessments of his intellectual functioning not based on 
intelligence tests” (Ybarra v. Nevada, 2011).  The record revealed, and the district court 
was persuaded by, the fact that Ybarra had never been tested for mental retardation in 
school.  Further, there was no indication from his school records that any teacher, 
administrator, counselor, school psychologist, or other educational professional had ever 
suspected Ybarra of being mentally retarded.  An example of information used in this 
case included documents from Ybarra’s seventh-grade teacher describing Ybarra as a “C 
to C+ student who had no learning problems and could have worked harder” Ybarra v. 
Nevada, 2011).  The court found this evidence more persuasive than Ybarra’s experts. In 
affirming the district court, the Supreme Court noted the evidence previously referred to 
and concluded that the district court’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence, 
the applicable standard (Ybarra v. State of Nevada, 2011). 
 The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the district court in Ybarra highlights the 
weight courts place on school records, as well as how important these records become in 
an Atkins context. Since school psychologists are often the professionals most equipped 
to identify mental retardation during the developmental period, it is essential they do so.  
Ybarra may well not have suffered from mental retardation.  That said, it is clear that the 
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failure to at least document cognitive and academic struggles during the developmental 
stage can undermine later attempts by defendants to successfully assert Atkins claims.   
School psychologists must also be aware of various threats to validity, including 
malingering.  Currently, assessment of malingering in evaluations for children is rare, 
though necessary in some situations (Walker, 2011). There appears to be some 
preliminary evidence that some malingering screeners already developed may be valid 
for use with children (Blaskewitz, Merten, & Kathmann, 2008; Gast & Hart, 2010; 
Donders, 2005).  School psychologists need to be aware of these situations and know 
when it is necessary to conduct such screenings.  
 These issues suggest the broader importance of school psychologists and the 
work they do.  School psychologists are qualified professionals who provide invaluable 
services to children, schools, and society. Though their direct services apply to issues, 
such as those described, they are also in a unique position to inform social issues. School 
psychologists understand intellectual assessments, including the value such assessments 
possess, as well as the limitations. They understand the theoretical and practical aspects 
of issues such as those confronted in the Atkins context. School psychologists and their 
professional associations, can inform courts and policymakers  as to the proper role of IQ 
tests, adaptive behavior assessments, as well as other issues that affect not only the 
determination of mental retardation, but the determination of other academic, social, or 
emotional impediments that could eventually affect these students throughout the 
lifespan.  
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Summary 
 This chapter described why it is important to consider malingering when 
assessing for mental retardation, particularly in the forensic context.  The background of 
the problem was discussed, as was the nature of the study and its significance.  Research 
questions were outlined and the assumptions detailed.  Chapter 2 will provide a more 
extensive review of the literature and Chapter 3 will describe the methodology employed 
in significantly more depth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter will begin with a general overview of mental retardation, 
characteristics of mental retardation, and typical approaches to assessing mental 
retardation with specific focus placed on the adaptive behavior assessment.  Though there 
is slight variability in the various definitions of mental retardation, this current review 
and examination will apply the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) definition.  
Next, the legal relevance of mental retardation in relation to capital punishment will be 
discussed.  Specifically, Atkins v. Virginia, the landmark case on point, will be reviewed 
and explained. Finally, malingering in forensic populations is discussed with the specific 
focus on malingering of mental retardation.   
Mental Retardation 
 Mental retardation is a diagnostic category of disability used to describe 
individuals with significant delays in cognitive functioning and everyday functioning 
(APA, 2000).  Though definitions of mental retardation vary slightly among various 
professional associations, there are typically three well established prongs associated with 
this condition.  First, individuals with mental retardation have significant cognitive, or 
intellectual, deficits. Second, individuals with mental retardation have significant deficits 
in adaptive behaviors.  Third, mental retardation has an onset prior to age 18 (APA, 
2000).  Currently, the prevalence rate of mental retardation is approximately 1% of the 
general population. (APA, 2000).   
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 Mental Retardation is usually differentiated among four different categories, or 
levels of functioning.  The four levels include: Mild, Moderate, Severe, and Profound 
(APA, 2000). Each of these categories are separated based on level of deficit.  For 
instance, people with mild mental retardation have IQs measured by standard scores 
between 55-70. People with moderate mental retardation usually have IQs measured by 
standard scores between 40-54.  People with severe mental retardation usually show IQ’s 
measured by standard scores between 25-39.  People with profound mental retardation 
have IQ’s measured by standard scores below 25 (APA, 2000).  Within the subgroup of 
people with mental retardation, mild mental retardation is the category most often 
diagnosed (APA, 2000; Bonnie, 2004). 
 Prior to 1916, mental retardation was primarily identified through intelligence 
tests (Doll, 1967).  Beginning in the 1920’s Edgar Doll became a leading figure in 
creating standardized methods of measuring adaptive behavior, as well as promoting the 
importance of considering adaptive behavior constructs when identifying mental 
retardation (Doll, 1936).  In 1961, the American Association of Mental Deficiency 
(AAMD) distributed its formal diagnostic framework for mental retardation which 
included adaptive behavior deficits as an essential component of the disorder (Herber, 
1961). Considering intelligence, adaptive behavior, and mental retardation are constructs 
developed mostly during the twentieth century, there appears to be much that is not 
understood about how best to diagnose the condition. This is particularly the case when it 
comes to mental retardation in an Atkins context. 
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Assessing Mental Retardation 
 Diagnosticians are able to identify mental retardation when they conduct 
comprehensive evaluations and determine that the specific criteria are met.  At a 
minimum, these evaluations include gathering information related to infant and childhood 
development, an assessment of intelligence, and an assessment of adaptive behavior 
(Broadsky & Galloway, 2003).  Sometimes, in order to differentiate mental retardation 
from other diagnoses, further assessments need to be conducted to examine constructs 
such as academic functioning, emotional functioning, and behavioral functioning 
(Broadsky & Galloway, 2003).  
Intellectual assessment. 
Of the three main areas examined to determine a mental retardation diagnosis, the 
assessment of intelligence is the area that tends to be the most widely recognized 
component.  Intelligence is a construct that receives a lot of attention from researchers 
and laypersons.  This is likely why laypersons readily think of low intelligence as being 
associated with mental retardation.  However, laypersons often do not know what 
adaptive behaviors are (Doane & Salekin, 2009). In addition, they often do not know that 
low adaptive behaviors are also an essential component to determining whether someone 
has mental retardation. 
Adaptive behavior assessment. 
 Like the construct of intelligence, the construct of adaptive behavior is broad, has 
changed slightly over time, and is defined in a variety of ways (Doane & Salekin, 2009).  
The broad construct of adaptive behavior has been similar over time and among 
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researchers.  The following is a definition of adaptive behavior that continues to be how 
the construct is understood today.  Adaptive behavior is “the degree to which the 
individual is able to function and maintain him- or herself independently and the degree 
to which he or she meets satisfactorily the culturally imposed demands of personal and 
social responsibility” (Herber, 1961, p. 61).   
Adaptive behavior can be broken down into various sub-domains that further 
delineate what adaptive behavior is. The American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), formerly known as the American Association on 
Mental Retardation (AAMR), splits adaptive behavior into three domains: conceptual 
skills, practical skills, and social skills (AAIDD, 2010).  Each of these domains can be 
further broken down by sub-skills.   Though there tends to be general agreement about 
the definition of adaptive behavior, the sub-skills that make up these broad constructs 
vary (Doane & Salekin, 2009).  This has some affect on how adaptive behavior is 
understood, defined, and measured.  Given that adaptive behavior is determined in 
relation to one’s cultural demands, the understanding of what are considered typical sub-
skills and specific behaviors necessarily change over time (APA, 2000). 
 Definitions of mental retardation rarely require a specific score on a given 
adaptive behavior scale in order to determine whether or not an individual has mental 
retardation (National Research Council, 2002).  For instance, since adaptive behavior is 
comprised of many domains, it is difficult for one assessment to comprehensibly measure 
all of the relevant domains with reliability and validity.  Adaptive behavior scales vary 
since expected adaptive behaviors differ depending on context, age, and breadth 
(National Research Council, 2002).  Further, depending on which definition of mental 
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retardation an evaluator is using, the ways in which adaptive behavior scores will be 
interpreted vary within the context of the evaluation.  Some definitions require that a 
specific number of adaptive behavior domains have specific scores in order for an 
individual to be found as having mental retardation (APA, 2000).  In other instances, 
there are only vague guidelines.  For example, The DSM-IV only requires that the 
examinee demonstrates “significant limitations in adaptive behavior,” from “one or more 
reliable independent sources,” (APA, 2000).  Absent from this definition is how severe 
adaptive behavior deficits need to be for an individual to qualify as having mental 
retardation, and how many adaptive behavior domains need to be impaired for this 
diagnosis.   
Not only are there differing perspectives on what sub-skills constitute adaptive 
behavior, there are also differing perspectives about how adaptive behavior should factor 
into a mental retardation diagnosis.  Some believe that adaptive behavior is a distinct 
construct, separate from intelligence, holding equal weight as intelligence in determining 
the diagnosis (Division 33 of the American Psychological Association and AAIDD, 
2010).  Others believe that adaptive behavior deficits occur as the result of a person’s low 
intelligence, and that low intelligence causes the adaptive skills to be lower than would 
be expected for a person with average intelligence. Another debate among researchers is 
the nature of adaptive behavior.  Some believe that it can accurately be measured with a 
single score, whereas others believe that adaptive behavior is hierarchical (Widaman & 
McGrew, 1996).  Yet another theory is that adaptive behavior is a multi-dimensional 
construct made up of three domains: personal independence, responsibility, 
cognitive/academic (Thompson, McGrew, & Bruininks, 1999).  
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 Despite heavy reliance on standard scores within some definitions of mental 
retardation, this is a diagnosis that cannot be consistently determined simply by looking 
at scores.  The relationship between intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior is 
complex.  Intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior scores are more closely related 
when it comes to severe and moderate ranges, but not as closely related for individuals 
with mild mental retardation (Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Balla, 2005).   
Considerations in Forensic Assessment 
 Forensic evaluations differ from evaluations conducted in the general community.  
This is especially the case when it comes to forensic assessments conducted for Atkins 
claims. Given that mental retardation is a high stakes diagnosis with a potentially large 
incentive, evaluators should incorporate methods to detect signs of malingering as a 
matter of course (Brodsky & Galloway, 2003). 
 As difficult as it is to measure adaptive behavior functioning, it is especially 
difficult to do so with prisoners. In general, since adaptive behavior is supposed to be 
measured by community standards and expectations, not those of prison life (Tasse, 
2009).  Also, most adaptive behavior scales do not have specific norms for forensic 
populations or for capital criminals (Tasse, 2009).  Given that so few people with mental 
retardation would even be available to establish sufficient norms for such an assessment, 
such a specified adaptive behavior scale would be nearly impossible to develop (Tasse, 
2009). Finally, it is much more difficult to find an objective reporter of adaptive 
behaviors in the forensic context than in typical community evaluation contexts.  Those 
who would most likely serve as raters would likely be guards, fellow inmates, prison 
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staff, or the target prisoner himself.  The chances of these raters having a vested interest 
in the outcome of the adaptive scores are high, thus decreasing the validity of the 
measurements (Fabian, 2005). 
Atkins v. Virginia 
Pre-Atkins: Penry v. Lynaugh. 
The issue surrounding the constitutionality of allowing capital punishment against 
convicted criminals with mental retardation has been debated for decades.  The first 
United States Supreme Court case specifically examining whether this practice should be 
prohibited occurred in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989).    The constitutional issue in Penry was 
whether executing people with mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” 
(U.S. Const. amend. XIII). In order to justify prohibiting this practice and deem it to be 
unconstitutional, the Court had to have an objective indication that there was a national 
consensus that such practices were a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Though the 
Court was presented with public opinion surveys and resolutions by professional 
organizations, such evidence was not as persuasive as state statutes enacted by the 
legislatures, according to the Justices (Penry v. Lynaugh, 1989).  At the time Penry was 
decided, laws prohibiting executions of people with mental retardation were only enacted 
in two states (Penry v. Lynaugh, 1989). 
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Facts and procedural posture in Atkins. 
Less than ten years later, another crime took place that would once again present 
the United States Supreme Court with the same issue that had been argued in Penry. On 
August 16, 1996, Daryl Atkins and William Jones kidnapped, robbed, and murdered Eric 
Nesbitt (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Atkins and Jones both testified that they committed the 
kidnapping and robbery, though each blamed the other for having actually shot Nesbitt.  
During the guilt phase of the trial, Atkins’ testimony was less coherent and more 
inconsistent than Jones’ testimony.  A jury found Atkins guilty of abduction, armed 
robbery, and capital murder (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense introduced as a witness a 
forensic psychologist who had previously evaluated Atkins before the trial.  Based on the 
results obtained from the psychologist’s administration of the Wechsler Adult Intellectual 
Scales, Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1997), he determined Atkins had a full scale 
standard score intelligence quotient (IQ) of 59.  Also, the forensic psychologist conducted 
a review of Atkins’ prior school records, interviewed Atkins, interviewed Atkins’ family 
members, reviewed court records, and interviewed deputies at the jail where Atkins had 
been for 18 months.  After looking at Atkins’ history of poor adaptive functioning, as 
well as his current intellectual deficits, the psychologist determined that Daryl Atkins had 
mild mental retardation. Despite this evidence, the jury chose to sentence Atkins to death 
(Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
After this decision at the trial court level, Atkins appealed his case to the Virginia 
Supreme Court.  He argued that, because he had mental retardation, he should not be 
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sentenced to death.  Though two of the State Supreme Court Justices agreed that 
imposing the death penalty on someone with limited intellectual functioning was 
excessive, the majority of the Court relied on the holding in Penry and affirmed the death 
penalty as punishment. (Atkins v. Commonwealth, 2000).  Once again, Atkins appealed, 
this time to the United States Supreme Court. The United State Supreme Court agreed to 
visit the issue by granting certiorari.  The Court cited the grave concerns expressed by the 
dissenting Justices from the lower court, as well as the “dramatic shift in the state 
legislative landscape” that had occurred since Penry as reasons for why they agreed to 
grant certiorari (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 310).   
Issue and arguments before the Supreme Court in Atkins. 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia was whether the death 
penalty, in such a circumstance, constituted a cruel and unusual punishment (Atkins v. 
Virginia, 2002).  The Court previously held that punishments must be examined in 
proportion to their offences. Punishments that are excessive and out of proportion to their 
offenses are considered to be cruel and unusual (Weems v. United States, 1910; Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 1991).  The Court also emphasized that the standards by which a 
punishment is deemed to be unusual are “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,” (Trop. V. Dulles, 1958, p. 101).  In sum, the Court was 
tasked with examining the punishment in relation to the crime, as well as what modern 
society understands to be an acceptable punishment, as opposed to cruel and unusual. 
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Holding and majority opinion.   
 On June 20, 2002, Justice Stevens delivered the Court’s majority opinion in which 
Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer 
joined.  Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas.  Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Thomas joined.  The majority held that, under the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, states were prohibited from sentencing criminals with mental 
retardation to the death penalty (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
The majority focused on three main rationales to explain their holding.  First, the 
majority examined what the consensus of public opinion was on this matter by examining 
the ways in which state legislatures had addressed the issue through their enactment of 
statutes and policies.  Next, the majority examined the policy justifications behind capital 
punishment, namely, retribution and deterrence.  The majority examined whether these 
policy rationales made sense when applied to individuals with mental retardation.  Third, 
the majority discussed various reasons why defendants with mental retardation are more 
likely than defendants without mental retardation to be wrongfully executed.  The 
majority determined that all of these factors weighed in favor of prohibiting capital 
punishment for criminals with mental retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
The majority first delineated how a punishment is determined to be excessive or 
cruel and unusual.  In making this consideration, the punishment must be “graduated and 
proportioned to the offense” (Weems v. United States, 1910, p. 367).  Also, the 
determination of whether a punishment is excessive or cruel and unusual has to do with 
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evolving standards of decency at the time the issue is being considered using “objective 
factors to the maximum extent possible” (Harmelin, 1991, p. 1000). In order to do this, 
the majority first reviewed the opinions of the country’s legislatures on the issue of 
allowing criminals with mental retardation to be executed.  The majority pointed out that, 
when the United States Congress reinstated the death penalty in 1988 and later expanded 
it in 1994, they expressly prohibited the death penalty for criminals with mental 
retardation guilty of federal crimes (21 U.S.C. §848; 18 U.S.C. §3596 c).  The majority 
also cited the number of state legislative enactments passed since Penry, the large number 
of legislators in favor of these statutes, legislative statutes that were pending in states 
where they had yet to be passed, and the Report of the Governor’s Commission on 
Capital Punishment.  Finally, it cited other markers of public opinion, such as position 
statements by professional organizations, religious bodies, public opinion surveys and 
international organization opinions  (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
Next, the majority discussed the policy rationales behind capital punishment.  
Proponents of capital punishment tend to agree it serves as both a deterrent for other 
criminals from engaging in crimes and it also serves as retribution against those who have 
committed serious wrongdoing (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). The majority argued that 
deterring prospective offenders from committing capital offenses through the existence of 
capital punishment only makes sense in cases where prospective offenders’ actions are 
premeditated and deliberate.  If, on the other hand, an offender has mental retardation 
manifesting in cognitive and behavioral deficits that result in decreased ability to process 
information, control impulses, and understand consequences, capital punishment would 
not have the deterrent effect it is intended to have (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  
32 
 
The second major policy rationale behind capital punishment is that it serves as 
retribution for the crime committed.  Retribution is related to the culpability of a criminal 
and capital punishment and is intended to be reserved for the most culpable criminals 
(Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  Justice Stevens explained, “If the culpability of the average 
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the 
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of 
retribution” (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  In sum, the majority concluded that the 
justifications used for allowing capital punishment do not make sense for criminals with 
mental retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
In addition to the two main reasons for the Court’s conclusion, the majority also 
pointed out that people with mental retardation have less capacity to defend themselves 
than typical defendants do.  For instance, people with mental retardation make false 
confessions more frequently than people without mental retardation (Everington & 
Fulero, 1999).  People with mental retardation tend to give less meaningful information 
to counsel, often make poor witnesses, and tend to be more contradictory in their retelling 
of events (Gresham, 2009).  Further, their lack of understanding may lead them to show 
fewer nonverbal cues indicating their appreciation for the seriousness of proceedings 
(Finlay & Lyons, 2002; Olley, 2010). A jury may interpret a defendant’s flat affect as a 
sign that the defendant does not have remorse for his actions (AAIDD, 2010).  All of 
these factors suggest that defendants with mental retardation are likely not equipped to 
defend themselves in court as effectively as defendants without mental retardation. 
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Dissenting opinions. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Justice Rehnquist took issue with the types of 
sources the majority considered when coming to its conclusion that capital punishment 
for people with mental retardation is cruel and unusual according to evolving standards of 
decency.  He took particular issue with the public polls the majority considered and 
questioned the studies’ methodologies (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  Justice Rehnquist 
believed that the only sources the majority should have considered were work product of 
legislatures and determinations made by sentencing juries.   
Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Among other problems he saw 
with the decision, Justice Scalia was specifically concerned with the potential for 
criminals to feign having mental retardation in order to render themselves ineligible for 
the death penalty.   
 Justice Scalia was the most forceful person on the bench to suggest the potential 
risks of people without mental retardation pretending to have the condition in order to 
avoid the death penalty.  However, his concern was something the majority 
acknowledged.  The majority opinion stated, “To the extent that there is serious 
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining 
which offenders are in fact mentally retarded” (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 317). The 
majority then goes on to suggest that the Court would leave it to the state legislatures to 
determine how to enforce the Court’s decision and how to determine which Atkins claims 
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are valid.  Therefore, it was the majority’s stance that the question of whether capital 
punishment was a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution for defendants 
with mental retardation should be decided without deciding on how a determination of 
mental retardation for defendants would be made (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). 
Detecting Malingering 
As Justice Scalia mentioned in his dissenting opinion in Atkins, criminals may 
attempt to malinger having mental retardation in order to avoid being sentenced to death 
in capital crime cases.  Malingering is “the intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” 
(APA, 2000, p. 739).  This definition can essentially be divided into three crucial 
elements: false presentation of symptoms, intent on the part of the person presenting such 
symptoms, and external incentives motivating the person presenting such symptoms 
(Rogers, 2008).   
There are some contexts in which the chances of an examinee attempting to 
malinger increase significantly (APA, 2000).  Rogers (2008) described some of these 
situations. For instance, if the results of an evaluation could weigh in favor of an 
examinee getting a significant incentive, the chances of the examinee malingering to 
receive this incentive increase.  In the forensic context, there is a heightened chance that 
an examinee might malinger to avoid harsh judgments and punishments.  In the civil 
arena, there is a higher chance people will malinger in personal injury cases, child 
custody actions, divorce actions, employment screenings, and during disability 
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determination evaluations (Rogers, 2008).  For each of these situations, the examinees 
have important incentives to gain by appearing a certain way to the evaluator.  
After Atkins v. Virginia was decided, there was an increase in the number of 
criminals on death row requesting Atkins evaluations (Tasse, 2009).  The APA responded 
with a resource document with recommendations as to how state legislatures could codify 
a definition of mental retardation for Atkins purposes (Bonnie, 2004).  This resource 
document also provided suggestions about what minimum qualifications regarding what 
forensic evaluators should possess before evaluating Atkins claims, as well as what 
assessment procedures these evaluators should follow (Bonnie, 2004).   
 At the core of understanding test validity, and how well tests are able to measure 
what they are supposed to measure, is the concept of response styles.  People are 
evaluated in various ways and for various reasons, often having nothing to do with the 
forensic context.  Depending on the nature of the assessment, some individuals choose 
not to disclose information or answer questions completely accurately.  Depending on 
what that individual’s goals in that particular setting, the results may or may not reflect 
the objective truth of what the assessment is intended to measure (Rogers, 2008).  
Response styles are not fixed, and people may pick and choose which contexts they 
choose to disclose information about themselves. For instance, someone might answer 
questions on a pre-employment assessment in a way that makes him look good rather 
than completely reflect who he is.  The goal for that applicant is to get the job he is 
applying for.  In another situation, that same person may be more forthright and honest 
about himself. 
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 Rogers (2008), describes various ways in which malingering can be examined. 
One way of examining malingering is through a clinical interview.  There are various 
qualitative indicators an examiner should pay attention to while interviewing the 
examinee.  Exaggeration of symptoms, overly deliberate responses, reporting symptoms 
that are inconsistent with the examinee’s diagnosis, inconsistencies, and overt 
endorsement of symptoms are examples of examinee presentation styles that should alert 
examiners to the likelihood of malingering (Rogers, 2008).  
Another way examiners attempt to detect whether or not an examinee may be 
malingering, particularly in the forensic context, is through direct assessment with the 
examinee (Rogers, 2008). There are some psychological assessments that are designed 
specifically to detect the likelihood of malingering.  Other psychological assessments 
were created primarily to measure other constructs, but can be used secondarily to detect 
malingering and other threats to validity (Rogers, 2008).  
Rogers (2008) also reports that third-parties can often provide a wealth of 
information to examiners regarding their examinees.  In turn, this information can help 
validate an examiner’s impressions regarding the validity of evaluations.  Since the third 
element required for a diagnosis of mental retardation is onset prior to the age of 18, 
documentation of the examinee’s functioning at earlier ages is particularly crucial when 
trying to establish this diagnosis.  As previously stated, there are many adults who have 
mental retardation who had never been identified as having mental retardation prior to the 
age of 18.  Such an absence of the diagnosis does not preclude the individual from later 
being identified.  However, when there is historical third-party information about an 
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examinee that contradicts the examinee’s performance on a forensic evaluation, the 
suspicion of malingering will sharply increase. 
Malingering and Atkins Claims 
 A diagnosis of mental retardation requires that an individual’s cognitive 
functioning, or intelligence, is below a standard score of 70 (APA, 2000).  However, 
there are various types of cognitive impairments that do not necessarily fall to the level of 
cognitive impairment needed for a diagnosis of mental retardation.  There are other 
disabilities, traumatic brain injuries, for instance, that consist of cognitive impairments, 
but that are distinguished from mental retardation (APA, 2000; Salekin & Doane, 2009). 
Currently, most of the research regarding assessment of malingering of mental retardation 
focuses on malingered memory difficulties and decreased effort put forth on cognitive 
assessments (Salekin & Doane, 2009).   
 A method to detect malingering using standardized tests is known as the Floor 
Effect (Rogers, 2008). Rogers (2008) explains that standardized assessments of 
intelligence are generally built to measure the construct of intelligence, but it is not 
common to find a cognitive assessment tool that incorporates validity indices within it to 
determine whether the examinee is malingering. However, by analyzing the response 
patterns of examinees on these assessments after the assessments have been given, 
researchers and practitioners are able to determine when a response pattern is typical or 
atypical for a variety of reasons.  For example, cognitive assessments often begin with 
simple tasks that even people with mild mental retardation could get correct.  Malingerers 
often fail to realize this fact, and may purposely answer the first few items on the 
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cognitive assessment incorrectly.  Given that most people, even people with mild mental 
retardation, would get these items correct, it should raise suspicion if a person misses 
these items.   
 Doane and Salekin (2009) examined how well participants were able to feign 
adaptive behavior deficits on the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition 
(ABAS-II; Harisson & Oakland, 2003) and the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised 
(SIB-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996).  Participants in this study 
were separated into one of four conditions:  the control condition, mental retardation 
condition, mild mental retardation condition, or moderate mental retardation condition.  
The participants in each condition, except for the control condition, received a form of 
coaching by being provided with written information.  The written information was 
specifically about mental retardation, mild mental retardation, and moderate mental 
retardation, respectively.  All participants were provided with instructions to complete the 
ABAS-II and the SIB-R in a manner that would make them display adaptive behavior 
functioning consistent with a person with mental retardation.  Results of this study 
revealed that coached participants were not any better at appearing to have adaptive 
behavior deficits than those who were not coached (Doane & Salekin, 2009). 
Gaps in the Research 
 Though more research is being conducted in the areas of mental retardation and 
malingering, there continues to be much that is unknown (Graue, Berry, Clark, Sollmon, 
Cardi, Hopkins, et al., 2007).  Adaptive behavior, in particular, is an area that has enjoyed 
less attention when it comes to malingering (Doane & Salekin, 2009).  Whereas many 
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laypersons understand the general concept of intelligence, adaptive behavior is a 
conceptual area that tends to be less understood.  The adaptive behavior prong to the 
mental retardation diagnosis is just as crucial when it comes to making the diagnosis as 
adaptive behavior is.  For this reason, more research needs to be conducted on how to 
detect malingering when measuring adaptive behavior.  There are some adaptive behavior 
assessment scales that have validity indicators incorporated into the tests themselves 
(Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). These may aid in the detection of malingering, but have 
not yet been researched in an Atkins context. 
Summary 
This chapter provided a brief description of the history of mental retardation, as 
well as a brief history of each of the main constructs in the diagnosis: intelligence and 
adaptive behavior.   The legal relevance of mental retardation in relation to capital 
punishment was discussed.  Specifically, Atkins v. Virginia, and its predecessor, Penry v. 
Lynaugh, were reviewed and explained, particularly in terms of their holdings. This 
chapter provided information about assessment of intelligence, adaptive behavior, and of 
malingering.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Methods 
Introduction 
The most important constructs to measure when determining whether an 
individual has mental retardation are intellectual ability and adaptive behavior.  Forensic 
psychologists have research to draw upon when trying to determine how individuals feign 
intellectual impairments (Graue, Berry, Clark, Sollman, Cardi, Hopkins, & Werline, 
2007).  However, very little research is available that addresses how to detect when a 
person is trying to feign having adaptive behavior deficits (Doane & Salekin, 2009).  It is 
presumably easy for anyone to research the definition of mental retardation and 
determine that adaptive behavior deficits are crucial to the definition.  Likewise, it would 
be presumably easy for anyone to research the definition of adaptive functioning and 
have a general understanding of what it means.  For this reason, it is important for 
forensic examiners trying to establish the legitimacy of an Atkins claim to understand not 
only how to detect malingering in relation to intellectual assessments, but also how to 
detect malingering in relation to adaptive behavior assessments. 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate whether laypersons provided with a 
clinical definition of mental retardation (i.e. “informed-malingering group”) are more 
effective at malingering mental retardation than laypersons who were not provided such 
information (i.e. “malingering group”).  Further, this study sought to investigate possible 
differences between the malingering group, the informed-malingering group, and 
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laypersons giving a good faith effort at completing a series of assessments in a valid 
manner (i.e. “control group”).  
Participants 
 A total of 75 participants were originally sought for this study. In order to obtain 
that number of participants within a relatively short period of time, a convenience 
sampling plan was employed.  All participants in this study had at least some college 
education, were living in Nevada at the time of their participation, and were at least 18 
years of age.  The participants were recruited from the University of Nevada in both Las 
Vegas and Reno in a variety of ways.  Participants were notified about the study through 
a subject pool announcement, announcements by professors in undergraduate and 
graduate level education courses, word of mouth from other participants, and recruitment 
fliers.  At least half of the participants volunteered to participate in this study in order to 
earn participation points in their classes.  Other participants volunteered in this study out 
of interest in psychological tests or out of interest in the research topic.  The groups of 
participants who did not receive class credit were provided with snacks and non-alcoholic 
beverages in appreciation for their time. 
 The study was administered to groups of participants mostly in classrooms, 
though one group of participants completed the study in a private room at a public 
building.  All group settings were reserved only for participants and the researcher during 
the time allotted.  During the administration of the study, participants were asked to 
silence their cellular phones, and they did not have access to computers.  Therefore, while 
the study was being conducted, distractions were kept to a minimum, and the only 
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information relevant to the study that participants were able to access, was the 
information provided to them by the researcher. 
 During each administration of this study, the researcher would greet participants 
and provide each person with a consent form, which included the following information: 
the department conducting the study, the title of the study, the names of the investigators, 
the contact phone numbers and e-mails for the principal investigator and graduate student 
researcher, the purpose of the study, the requirements to be a participant in the study, the 
general study procedures, the benefits of participation, the risks of participation, the 
voluntary nature of the participation, and an explanation for how the information 
obtained from the participants would be kept confidential.  The participants were asked to 
initial and sign their forms if they agreed to be part of the study.  The researcher was 
available to answer any questions about the consent forms, and collected all consent 
forms prior to beginning the study. 
Instrumentation 
Demographic survey. 
A demographic survey was administered in order to obtain basic information 
about participants.  The survey asked the participants to indicate the following 
information: age, gender, major undergraduate field of study, and grade point average.  
The purpose of including a demographic survey in this study was to determine whether 
any observed differences in scores on the standardized assessments used in this study 
could possibly be attributed to differences in participant characteristics rather than actual 
performance differences on the assessments.  The information obtained from the 
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demographic survey also served to inform the extent to which the results of this study 
could be generalized to a larger population.  Finally, the information obtained from the 
demographic survey provided specific information that will be essential for future 
researchers who desire to replicate this study. 
Baseline Definition Questionnaire (BDQ).  
All participants were asked to complete a Baseline Definition Questionnaire 
(BDQ) to help determine how much the participants knew about mental retardation prior 
to receiving instructions or completing the standardized assessment.   The BDQ was 
adapted from a similar questionnaire used by Doane and Salekin (2009) where examinees 
were given one open-ended item asking the participants to define mental retardation.  In 
that study, responses were then used to determine how many components of American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) definition of mental retardation the participant was able to 
generate from their fund of knowledge (e.g. IQ deficits, adaptive behavior deficits, and 
onset prior to age 18).     
 The BDQ in the present study first asked participants to describe the main 
characteristics of mental retardation.  The responses to this question were later scored on 
a scale from zero to three depending on the number of correct characteristics the 
participants were able to identify.  Since mental retardation has three main components in 
its definition, a participant who was able to identify all three components received a score 
of three. A person who was able to identify only two components received a score of two, 
and so on.  The second question on the BDQ asked the participants whether they had any 
44 
 
personal knowledge or experiences with people with mental retardation.  If so, 
participants were asked to describe their personal knowledge or experiences.   
The BDQ was included in this study for a few reasons. The questions were 
designed to determine the participants’ clinical knowledge and experiential knowledge of 
mental retardation.  The information was gathered before the participants read their main 
instructions and before they completed the standardized assessments according to their 
instructions.  This information was gathered to later determine if any observed 
differences between group scores could be attributed to differences in the participants’ 
prior knowledge and prior experience rather than differences in the actual performance on 
the assessments.  This information also helped to later determine the generalizability of 
the study’s statistical findings.  Finally, the information obtained from the BDQ provides 
readers of this study with necessary information to be able to interpret the scope of 
generalizability of the results obtained, as well as the information necessary to replicate 
the current study. 
 Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Second Edition. 
 SILS-2 general description. 
 The Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Second Edition (SILS-2) is an assessment 
tool used to provide a basic indicator of intelligence and cognitive functioning for people 
ages 7 to 89 years (Shipley, 2009).  It was selected to be the intellectual assessment for 
this study. The SILS-2 does not yield a comprehensive intelligence composite, but it does 
help examiners determine when a comprehensive intellectual assessment is warranted.  
The SILS-2 consists of a Vocabulary subtest, a nonverbal Block Patterns subtest, and a 
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nonverbal Abstraction subtest.  Examiners typically administer the Vocabulary subtest 
along with either the Block Patterns subtest or the Abstraction subtest.  The Block 
Patterns subtest and the Abstraction subtest measure similar constructs (Shipley, 2009).  
 The Vocabulary subtest measures an individual’s crystallized ability.  Crystallized 
ability is knowledge that a person accumulates through experience and education 
(Shipley, 2009).  On the Vocabulary subtest, examinees are presented with a number of 
target vocabulary words next to which are four other words.  One of the four words next 
to the target word is a synonym of the target word.  The examinee is given ten minutes to 
go through the list of target words and circle their corresponding synonyms. This subtest 
requires the examinee to have a fund of general information, language abilities, and 
vocabulary in order to produce the correct answers (Shipley, 2009).   
Both the Block Patterns subtest and the Abstraction subtest measure an 
individual’s fluid cognitive ability.  Fluid ability is, “The ability to use logic and other 
skills to learn and acquire new information; for example, solve novel puzzles or 
problems, understand new concepts or ideas, take in new information, and so forth” 
(Shipley, 2009). The Block Patterns subtest requires examinees to look at blocks shaded 
in particular patterns and identify missing pieces of the pattern.  Examinees are given 10 
minutes to perform this task.  This subtest measures nonverbal reasoning skills, spatial 
ability, and visual imagery (Shipley, 2009). 
SILS-2 reliability. 
 The SILS-2 manual indicates that the cognitive composite scores have adequate 
internal consistency reliability (Shipley, 2009).  When the Vocabulary and Abstraction 
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(Composite A) subtests are given together, as they were in the present study, the internal 
consistency reliability estimates range between .88 and .97.  Test-retest reliability 
correlation scores are also adequate.  For the adult population, the test-retest reliability on 
Composite A was .94.   
 SILS-2 validity. 
In addition to adequate reliability, the SILS-2 manual reports that the instrument 
has good content validity, construct validity and discriminative validity (Shipley, 2009).  
The SILS-2 shows moderate to high correlations with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale, Third Edition (WAIS-III), a well established assessment measuring cognitive 
ability for adults.  For instance, the SILS-2 Composite A has a correlation of .86 with the 
WAIS-III Full Scale IQ.   Differential validity of the SILS-2 was investigated with 
various clinical samples.  Of particular interest to this study, results suggest that the 
SILS-2 can effectively differentiate between individuals with intellectual impairments 
from those without such impairments. 
 The Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition. 
  
 General description. 
 
 The Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition (ABAS-II) assesses 
adaptive behavior in individuals throughout the lifespan (Harrison & Oakland, 2003). 
The ABAS-II measures everyday skills required to function, meet environmental 
demands, caring for self, and interact with others effectively and independently (Harrison 
& Oakland, 2003). The ABAS-II is compatible with state and federal special education 
classification systems, and it covers the ten adaptive skills specified in the DSM-IV-TR. 
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The Adult Form can be completed by the target individual as a self-report measure. The 
ABAS-II requires about 15 minutes to 20 minutes to complete (Harrison & Oakland, 
2003). 
The ABAS-II measures specific numerous specific skill areas, three adaptive 
domains, and one total adaptive behavior score.  The specific adaptive skill areas 
measured on the ABAS-II Adult Form are as follows: Communication, Community Use, 
Functional Academics, Home/School Living, Health and Safety, Leisure, Self-Care, Self-
Direction, Social, and Work (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  Items in each section are 
generally ordered from easiest to most difficult.   
The ABAS-II has three broad domain categories: Conceptual, Social, and 
Practical.  These domain categories are made up of combinations of the specific skill 
areas, and are reported as standard scores.  The Conceptual domain category is made up 
of the Communications, Functional Academics, and Self-Direction skill areas.  The 
Social domain category is made up of the Leisure and Social skill areas.  The Practical 
domain category consists of the following skill areas:  Self-Care, Home Living, 
Community Use, Health and Safety, and Work.  The Work skill area is an optional area 
on the ABAS-II Adult Form.  Each of the specific skill areas also combine to make the 
General Adaptive Composite (GAC), which is an overall indication of adaptive behavior.  
The GAC is reported as a standard score with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
15. 
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ABAS-II reliability. 
The ABAS-II manual reports a high degree of internal consistency among the 
items for each skill area, each of the three domain categories, and for the GAC (Harrison 
& Oakland, 2003).  Such high reliability was also estimated across age groups within the 
Adult Form, Self Report, across different levels of adaptive functioning, and among 
individuals with different clinical diagnoses (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  For the ABAS-
II Adult Form, Self-Report, GAC, the reliability coefficient was .99 for all age levels 
(Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  This was the case regardless of whether the Work skill area 
was calculated into the GAC.  The average reliability coefficients for the Conceptual 
domain, Social domain, and the Practical domain, were all high; .97, .96, and .97, 
respectively (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  Average reliability coefficients for the specific 
adaptive skill areas ranged from .88-.95 (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).    
The ABAS-II manual also cites excellent test-retest reliability for the Adult Form, 
Self Report (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  Test-retest reliability examines the consistency 
of the same rater’s rating of the same person between two administrations of the same 
assessment over a short period of time.  The test-retest interval for the ABAS-II Adult 
From, Self Report was examined using Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficient. The adults rating themselves using the ABAS-II Adult Form to establish test-
retest reliability had a mean interval of ten days between the first and second ratings.  The 
test-retest coefficients were strong, ranging from .91 to.96 for all specific skill areas, .95 
to .98 for all composite areas, .96 for the GAC without the inclusion of the Work skill 
area, and .99 for the GAC with the inclusion of the Work skill area (Harrison & Oakland, 
2003).   
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The ABAS-II manual reports excellent correlations between the ratings of 
different respondents using the different Adult-Forms (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  A 
total of 105 adults rated themselves using the Adult-Form Self Report, and 105 adults 
familiar with the self-raters then rated these same individuals using the Adult-From, 
Rated by Others.  The ratings between the adults rating themselves on the Adult-Form 
Self Report were correlated with the ratings from the Adult-Form, Rated by Others.  
Reliability coefficients were calculated using Fisher’s z transformation.  The cross-
correlation coefficients were moderate to strong, ranging from .80-.94 for all specific 
skill areas, .90-.92 for all composite areas, .95 for the GAC without the inclusion of the 
Work skill area, and .93 for the GAC with the inclusion of the Work skill area (Harrison 
& Oakland, 2003).   
ABAS-II validity. 
In addition to good reliability, the ABAS-II manual also reports extensive 
evidence that supports its use as an assessment that measures the construct of adaptive 
behavior, as well as the specific types of adaptive behavior (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).    
The ABAS-II specific skill areas were developed from the American Association on 
Mental Retardation’s (AAMR’s) explanation of the ten skills most indicative of adaptive 
behavior (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  The way the specific skill areas are grouped into 
Conceptual, Social, and Practical composite scores was also informed by AAMR 
guidelines established in 2002 (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  The items in each of the 
specific skill areas were derived from extensive research regarding the skills necessary to 
function successfully in different settings at different ages.  Ultimately, the items selected 
for inclusion in the ABAS-II were selected based on four principles: 
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1. To measure adaptive skills relevant to clinical and applied practice 
2. To ensure sufficient numbers of items to provide a comprehensive and robust 
measure of each skill area while not making the test too long (e.g., to not have 
more items than needed) 
3. To measure qualities that could be readily observed; and 
4. To ensure that the test displays suitable psychometric qualities (Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003, p. 114). 
The ABAS-II confirmatory factor-analytic research examined the relationship 
between the ten specific adaptive skill areas, the three composite areas, and the overall 
GAC to determine the extent to which the hypothesized structure of the test was 
consistent with actual evidence of the structure (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  The factor 
models were analyzed using goodness-of-fit measures, which produce values 
representing the extent to which the model actually fits the structure of the model 
hypothesized.  Results revealed that the hypothesized structure of the ABAS-II 
demonstrated a good fit with the actual observed structure of the ABAS-II (Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003).  This was demonstrated not only with the relationship of the ten specific 
skill areas to the overall GAC, but also with the ten specific skill areas to their respective 
adaptive behavior composites.  The ten specific skill constructs, though distinct from one 
another, are more related to their respective composite domain constructs than are the 
adaptive skills outside of their composite domains (Harrison & Oakland, 2003). 
Likewise, though the three composite domain constructs are distinct from one another, 
they all are all related to the overall general adaptive behavior GAC (Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003).    
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Though adaptive skills and intelligence are two different constructs, they are 
related to some degree. For this reason, the ABAS-II manual cites validity studies for the 
ABAS-II included correlations between the ABAS-II Adult-Forms and the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition (WAIS-III).  A non-clinical sample of 37 adults 
were evaluated with the WAIS-III and then asked to complete the ABAS-II Adult-Form, 
Self Report.  The scores from the specific adaptive skills, the composite domains, and the 
GAC were correlated with the WAIS-III Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, and Full Scale IQ 
scores.  Results indicated that the mean GAC was a standard score of 109, and the mean 
WAIS-III Full Scale IQ was a standard score of 111 (.67) (Harrison & Oakland, 2003). 
The GAC had a correlation of .72 with the WAIS-III Verbal IQ and .50 with the 
Performance IQ (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  The correlations between the WAIS-III 
Full Scale IQ and the ABAS-II ten specific skills were generally in the .40’s (Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003).  The correlations between the WAIS-III Full Scale IQ and the ABAS-II 
composite domains ranged between .48 to .54 (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).    
Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition.  
 BASC-2 general description. 
 The Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition (BASC-2) is a 
system used to measure various dimensions of behavior and personality for pre-school 
children, school-age children, adolescents, and adults (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
The BASC-2 has forms for different raters depending on the age group being evaluated: 
Teacher Report, Parent Report, and Self-Report. The specific form used in this study was 
the BASC-2 Self-Report of Personality (BASC-2) for adults.  There are a total of 185 
52 
 
questions on this assessment for respondents to answer. The first part of the BASC-2 
contains questions in a true/false format, and the second section requires the examinee to 
respond to items in one of four ways: Never, Sometimes, Often, or Almost Always.  The 
items on this form are written at approximately a third-grade reading level, and the 
overall time to complete this particular form is between 20 to 30 minutes (Reynolds & 
Kamphaus, 2004).  . 
The BASC-2 yields an overall Emotional Symptoms Index (ESI) made up of the 
following composite scores: Inattention/Hyperactivity, Internalizing Problems, and 
Personal Adjustment.  The composite scores are made up of the following16 scales:  
Alcohol Abuse, Anxiety, Attention Problems, Atypicality, Depression, Hyperactivity, 
Interpersonal Relations, Locus of Control, Relations with Parents, School Adjustment, 
Self-Esteem, Self-Reliance, Sensation Seeking, Sense of Inadequacy, Social Stress, and 
Somatization (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  . Of the scales, the following are 
considered measures of adaptive behavior: Relations with Parents, Interpersonal 
Relations, Self-Esteem, and Self-Reliance (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).   
The BASC-2 is designed to detect and measure the validity of the examinee 
responses.  The BASC-2 validity index scales can assist examiners in identifying 
exaggerated responding, as well as other inaccurate depictions of an individual’s behavior 
(Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  Such information makes the BASC-2 particularly useful 
in forensic settings where malingering is likely to occur (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
The validity indices include an F-Index which measures to what extent the examinee 
responded to items in an atypically negative fashion (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  The 
L-Index measures to what extent the examinee responded to items in an atypically 
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positive fashion (i.e. “faking good”) (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  The V-Index 
contains items that are absurd or highly unlikely.  Particular responses to these items may 
elevate the V-Index which generally indicates the examinee has been uncooperative 
(Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  The Response Pattern Index is used to detect atypical 
response patterns indicative of disregarding item content (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
Finally, the Consistency Index detects how often an examinee responds to similar items 
in a dissimilar manner (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
BASC-2 reliability. 
The BASC-2 manual reports high reliability scores in terms of internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  On the adult self-
report scale, the ESI internal consistency coefficient is .84, and the Personal Adjustment 
internal consistency coefficient is .94.  Test-retest reliability studies examined how 
consistent the ratings were when completed by the same person with 13 to 66 days in 
between each administration.  Results showed that, for the adult self-report scale, 
reliabilities were very good ranging from the upper .80’s to the low .90’s.  The ESI for 
this particular form showed test-retest reliability at .93, and the Personal Adjustment 
composite score showed test-retest reliability at .88 (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
These were the highest test-retest reliability ratings compared to the other self-report 
BASC-2 forms from other age groups.  Overall, this assessment appeared to have 
adequate reliability to be used in this study. 
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BASC-2 validity. 
In addition to strong reliability, the BASC-2 manual also reports good validity for 
the various scales within the assessment (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). This was 
determined through various validity tests, including examination of the scale inter-
correlations and factor structures, correlations with other self-report measures, and 
examination of profile trends with various clinical groups.  When the different scales 
were correlated with each other, the results showed that correlations within clinical scales 
were positive with each other, correlations within adaptive scales were positive, and 
correlations between clinical and adaptive scales were negative. Further, factor analysis 
was performed in developing the composites during the creation of the BASC-2.  The 
factor loadings show moderate to high loadings. In particular, the Personal Adjustment 
loadings ranged from .67 to .82 (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  The BASC-2 appears to 
have good internal and construct validity.  
The BASC-2 was correlated with the Achenbach System of Empirically Based 
Assessment Youth Self-Report Form (ASEBA; Achenback & Rescorla, 2001).  The Total 
Problems composite on the ASEBA show moderate levels of correlation when compared 
to the ESI on the BASC-2 self-report for adults (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  The 
BASC-2 self-rating for adults was correlated with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Grapham, Ben-Porath, Telllegen, Dahlstrom, & 
Kaemmer, 2001).  The BASC-2 Adaptive Scales showed moderate correlations with the 
MMPI-2 scales measuring similar constructs.  The BASC-2 Adaptive Scales are shown 
as negative correlations due to the way the items are worded (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 
2004).  In other words, high scores on the BASC-2 Adaptive Scales are indicative of 
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better skills, whereas high scores on the MMPI-2 scales are indicative of behavior 
problems. Though many of the BASC-2 rating forms were compared to the original 
version of the BASC, the original BASC did not have rating scales for adults. Therefore, 
a comparison with the older test form could not be made. These results suggest that the 
BASC-2 appears to be measuring similar constructs as the other scales purporting to 
measure similar constructs. Overall, the BASC-2 appears to have acceptable validity and 
is an adequate tool for the purposes of this study (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).   
Data Collection 
Data was collected from a total of 70 participants.  The participants in this study 
completed the study in one sitting. The completion time for this study ranged from 45-90 
minutes.  The researcher administered the study to groups of students in classrooms on 
different dates throughout the fall and winter of 2011.  Noises and distractions were 
always kept to a minimum.  During each study session, the researcher was available for 
questions as they arose. 
Participant names, addresses, phone numbers, and other such identifying 
information were not collected in this study.  Each assessment protocol contained a 
number to identify which packet the various protocols belonged to. However, there was 
no information linking the protocols or packets with the participants completing these 
assessments.  Prior to participating in this study, participants were required to indicate 
that they received informed consent by printing and signing their names on the informed 
consent forms.  These forms were returned to the researcher before the participants began 
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completing forms and assessments for the study.  The consent forms were not linked to 
the packets themselves, either.  
 Informed consent. 
Prior to participating in this study, the researcher explained various key aspects of 
the study and asked for written consent from the participants indicating they had been 
informed about the study and were participating voluntarily. The researcher provided 
information to the participants orally, and they were also provided with a detailed 
explanation in writing.  The participants were provided with the following information on 
the consent form: 
1.  A general explanation of the purpose of the study and how the information 
obtained from the study would be used 
2. A statement indicating that participation in this study was voluntary and could 
be revoked at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which 
participants would otherwise be entitled 
3. The expected time commitment of their participation 
4. Foreseeable benefits associated with the study 
5. Foreseeable risks associated with the study 
6. The confidential nature of the data obtained in this study 
7. Details about how data would be stored, how long data would be stored, and 
how data would be destroyed 
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8. Contact information regarding future questions about the research and how to 
obtain ultimate findings  
The participants initialed each page, and signed the bottom of the form indicating they 
had been provide with information about the study and were voluntarily participating in 
the study.   
 Instructions. 
 After completing the informed consent forms, the researcher handed the 
participants packets at random.  Each packet contained the Demographic Survey, the 
BDQ, the SILS-2 Vocabulary subtest, the SILS-2 Abstraction subtest, the ABAS-II, and 
the BASC-2.  Each packet contained one of three types of instructions.  One of the 
instruction sets was the control group instructions. These instructions simply asked the 
participants to complete the assessments as themselves.  A second type of instruction set 
was the malingering group instructions (See Appendix A). These instructions included a 
brief description of the Atkins v. Virginia holding, and gave directions for the participant 
to complete the assessments in order to appear as though they had mental retardation.  
The third set of instructions was for the informed-malingering group.  These instructions 
included the same information provided to those in the malingering group condition, but 
APA definitions for Mental Retardation and adaptive functioning were also provided to 
the participants in the informed-malingering group (See Appendix C).  
 Direct assessment. 
 The assessment protocols in each packet were scored by the researcher.  The 
SILS-2 and the ABAS-II each have protocol pages designated to input raw scores, 
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standard scores, percentile ranks and confidence intervals. The researcher utilized these 
protocol scoring pages to score the SILS-2 and the ABAS-II. The researcher scored the 
BASC-2 using BASC-2 ASSIST computer scoring software.  Hard copies of the scores 
were printed and placed into the respective packets and a soft copy of the scores was 
saved on a USB drive which only the researcher had access to.  The completed packets 
were kept in a filing cabinet only accessible to the researcher.  All of the data will be kept 
for a period of three years after which time it will be destroyed.  Hard copies of 
documents will be shredded and soft copies of the documents will be deleted from the 
USB drive.   
Research Questions 
The following questions were used as a foundation for this study: 
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on intelligence scores obtained from 
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Second Edition (SILS-2)?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on adaptive behavior scores obtained 
from the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition (ABAS-II)?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on adaptive behavior scores obtained 
from the Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition (BASC-2) ? 
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group with regards to how well participants 
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are able to provide responses on the BASC-2 that go undetected by the built-in 
validity scales?   
Hypotheses 
 Participants in the control group were asked to complete their questionnaires and 
assessments honestly, they were asked to put forth their best attention, and they were 
asked to put forth their best efforts.  The participants in the malingering group and the 
informed-malingering group, together referred to as the “combined malingering group”, 
were asked to try to complete the assessments in such a way as to appear to have mental 
retardation.  Since the control group was expected to complete the assessments to the best 
of their abilities, and since the control group consisted of adults with at least some college 
education, it was hypothesized that the control group would have significantly higher 
scores on the SILS-2 total score, SILS-2 verbal score, SILS-2 nonverbal score, the 
ABAS-II General Adaptive Composite (GAC), and the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment 
score reaching statistical significance compared to the combined malingering groups.   
Both the malingering group and the informed-malingering group were asked to 
complete their assessments in order to appear as if they had mental retardation.  The only 
difference between these two groups was that the informed-malingering group was 
provided with the APA clinical definitions of mental retardation and adaptive 
functioning, whereas the malingering group was not provided with these definitions.  If 
the definitions, and the symptoms described in the definitions, were sufficient enough for 
the participants to realize how to malinger having the condition, then statistically 
significant differences would be expected between the groups on all test scores. In 
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addition, if Justice Scalia’s assertion was correct, the informed-malingering group would 
be more likely than the malingering group to have SILS-2 standard scores between about 
55 to 70, ABAS-II GAC standard scores between about 55 to 70, and BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment T-scores between 20 to 30. 
Though providing definitions of mental retardation and adaptive functioning may 
increase participant’s factual knowledge about what constitutes these constructs, such 
information was not expected to increase participant’s applied knowledge about how to 
complete assessments act in a manner consistent with having mental retardation. Applied 
clinical knowledge is not derived simply from reading information about clinical 
conditions.  Further, the psychological assessments used in the present study are regarded 
as sophisticated tools. Without access to norms tables for each of these assessments, it 
was expected to be very difficult for participants to know how many items to answer in 
order to obtain a specific standard score.  Finally, on the BASC-2, the items are not 
separated by their respective scales.  Since the items are not in any apparent order, it 
makes it even more difficult for participants to know what items are related to particular 
adaptive behavior constructs. For these reasons, no statistical significance was expected 
between the malingering group scores and the informed-malingering group scores on the 
SILS-2 total score, the ABAS-II GAC, and the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment score.  
 Since the control group was instructed to complete the BASC-2 in an honest 
manner, whereas the other groups were instructed to complete it in a dishonest manner, 
the control group was expected to have more “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 
validity indicators than the combined malingering group. Differences between the 
malingering group’s BASC-2 validity scales and those of the informed-malingering 
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group were not expected to reach statistical significance for two reasons. First, the 
BASC-2 items related to adaptive behavior are interspersed throughout many other items 
having to do with behaviors that are not loaded into the adaptive behavior scales.  Though 
participants in the informed-malingering group were provided with a definition of 
adaptive behavior, the definition describes adaptive behavior in broad terms. Individual 
behavioral items measured on the BASC-2, which combine to create the broad adaptive 
behavior scores, are not likely to be identified by someone who has not had specific 
training or experience with adaptive behavior assessments.  The second reason 
statistically significant differences were not expected between the malingering group and 
the informed-malingering group is because the validity indicators measure overall 
patterns of responses throughout the test.  Neither group was provided with information 
about how to respond deceptively to the BASC-2 items in a way that would be 
undetected by the BASC-2 validity indicators.  Overall, the researcher hypothesized that, 
between the malingering group and the informed-malingering group, scores would not be 
different enough to reach statistical significance on any of the measures examined. In 
addition, it was hypothesized that neither group would be effective at obtaining standard 
scores consistent with mild mental retardation on any of the assessments. 
Finally, since the participants in this study were recruited in the same way from 
similar settings, it was hypothesized that there would be no statistically significant 
difference in performance of the participants assigned to a malingering condition on 
measures in this study contingent on prior diagnostic knowledge about mental 
retardation. Additionally, it was hypothesized that there would be no statistically 
significant difference between performance of the participants assigned to a malingering 
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condition on measures in this study contingent on prior personal knowledge or experience 
with persons with mental retardation. 
Data Analysis 
 The data analysis used in this study was comprised of descriptive and inferential 
statistics.   Each of these analyses was conducted in SPSS Version 20 (SPSS) statistical 
program. The following information was used in the data set created through SPSS: 
assigned group, gender, age, major, grade point average, number of diagnostic criteria for 
mental retardation the participant was able to list, and whether the participant had 
personal experience with mental retardation. Nominal data, such as assigned group, 
gender, major, and experience, were all coded with numbers to allow for later analysis. 
The data was analyzed using descriptive statistics from a total of 68 participants. 
Participants included both male college students and female college students ranging 
from age 18 to 59 years old.   The participants were in the process of working on 
undergraduate majors, or had completed undergraduate majors, in the following areas:  
Education, Special Education, Psychology, Political Science/History, Fine Arts, 
Math/Science, or Other. Such data was used to describe the demographic make-up of the 
participants in this study.  
 The participants’ responses on the BDQ were analyzed and described using 
descriptive statistics.  The information obtained included the percentage of participants 
who listed all three necessary components of the APA’s definition of mental retardation, 
the percentage of participants who listed two components of the definition, the 
percentage of participants who only listed one component of the definition, and the 
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percentage of participants who could not indicate any of the necessary components of the 
APA’s definition of mental retardation. A Pearson’s Chi-square test was used to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in prior diagnostic 
knowledge among the three groups. This was necessary because any such significant 
differences would have implications on how other potentially observed differences in this 
study could be interpreted. 
The participants’ responses on the second BDQ question were also analyzed and 
described using descriptive statistics.  The information obtained included which 
participants had prior experience with people with mental retardation and which 
participants did not have prior experience with people with mental retardation. Another 
Pearson’s chi-square test was used to determine whether there were statistically 
significant differences among the three groups with regards to prior experience with 
people who have mental retardation.  This was essential, because significant differences 
among the groups would have implications on how other potential differences observed 
in this study could be interpreted. 
 A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the performance 
of the control group and the combined malingering groups on the SILS-2 total, verbal, 
and nonverbal scores to determine whether there were statistically significant score 
differences between these groups. Additional ANOVAs were conducted between the 
control group and the combined malingering groups to examine differences between the 
ABAS-II GAC scores, as well as the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores. Comparing 
the control group to the scores obtained from the combined malingering group helped to 
establish whether the instruments chosen for this study were appropriate. 
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One-way between subjects ANOVAs were conducted between the malingering 
group and the informed-malingering group comparing the scores from the following 
assessment scales: SILS-2 composite, SILS-2 verbal, SILS-2 nonverbal, ABAS-II GAC, 
and the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment.    The purpose of this analysis was to determine 
whether there were statistically significant score differences between these groups, and, if 
so, which group was more effective at obtaining scores consistent with what would be 
expected from a person with mental retardation.  Since the only controlled difference 
between the malingering group and the informed-malingering group in this study was that 
the latter group received clinical definitions of the relevant conditions, any score 
differences reaching statistical significance could be the result of the information the 
participants in that group were provided.  Alternatively, if these groups did not show 
statistically significant differences in their scores, it would appear as though having the 
clinical definitions of mental retardation and adaptive functioning did not elicit better or 
worse performance than the group not provided with the definitions. 
 A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate differences between the control 
group and the combined malingering group on the number of non-acceptable ratings on 
the BASC-2 validity scales. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis was chosen due to the 
categorical nature of the independent and dependent variables. Non-acceptable, or 
cautionary, ratings were determined by any shaded validity indicators on the various 
BASC-2 assessments.  Shaded indicators suggest that the results should either be 
interpreted with “caution” or “extreme caution”. Another Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted to evaluate differences between the malingering group and the informed-
malingering group on the number of non-acceptable ratings on the BASC-2 validity 
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scales.  The purpose behind this analysis was to see if having the APA definitions of 
mental retardation and adaptive functioning is associated with significantly less, or 
significantly more, non-acceptable ratings on the BASC-2 validity indicators. 
Further analyses were conducted to compare the effects of the prior diagnostic 
knowledge about mental retardation, as indicated by participants on the BDQ, on the 
experimental measures used in this study.   One-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
explore whether prior diagnostic knowledge influenced SILS-2 total, verbal, and 
nonverbal scores in the malingering and informed-malingering groups. One-way 
ANOVAs were also conducted to explore whether prior diagnostic knowledge influenced 
the ABAS-II GAC scores and the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores in the 
malingering and informed-malingering groups.  
Finally, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore whether personal 
knowledge or prior experience with persons with mental retardation, as indicated by 
participants on the BDQ, influenced SILS-2 total, verbal, and nonverbal scores of 
participants in the malingering and informed-malingering groups. Similarly, one-way 
ANOVAs were conducted to explore whether personal knowledge or prior experience 
with persons with mental retardation influenced scores on the ABAS-II GAC and the 
BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scale. 
Summary 
 The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether participants provided 
with the clinical definition of mental retardation are any different in their performance on 
the SILS-2 intelligence test, the ABAS-II adaptive behavior assessment, or the BASC-2 
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Adult Form, Self-Report. This chapter described the types of participants were sought for 
this study, how the participants were recruited, and the consent process to participate in 
the study. Next, the specific instruments used in this study were described generally, 
along with details about their respective psychometric properties. The specific research 
questions, hypotheses, and rationales were discussed. Finally, the overall research design 
and statistical analyses conducted were specified and reasons for selecting the particular 
analyses selected were explained. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether laypersons provided with a 
clinical definition of mental retardation (i.e. “informed-malingering group”) are more 
effective at malingering mental retardation than laypersons who are not provided such 
information (i.e. “malingering group”). Similar to prior studies investigating feigned 
mental retardation (Graue et al., 2007; Shandera et al, 2010), this study also included a 
control group.  Participants in the control group were instructed to complete the 
assessments to the best of their abilities, enabling comparison to the malingering groups, 
and serving as an experimental check of the appropriateness of the assessment 
instruments for the sampled population. 
Each participant completed a packet of information containing questionnaires, 
standardized behavioral checklists, and brief intellectual assessments.  Packets were 
randomly assigned. All packets contained the same questionnaires, checklists, and 
assessments. The only difference between the packets was the instructions about how the 
participant was expected to complete the questionnaires, checklists, and assessments. 
About one-third of the participants were given instructions to complete the forms in the 
packet as well as they could, whereas the other participants were instructed to complete 
the forms in order to appear as thought they had mental retardation.  Of the participants 
instructed to complete the forms as if they had mental retardation, only half of the 
participants received the actual definition of mental retardation and adaptive functioning. 
The other half did not receive any additional information. 
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All participants had to complete the same pre-evaluation forms with accurate 
information about themselves. First, a demographic survey was administered in order to 
obtain basic information about participants.  The survey asked participants to reveal the 
following information: age, gender, major undergraduate field of study, and grade point 
average (GPA).  Next, all participants were asked to complete a Baseline Definition 
Questionnaire (BDQ) to help establish how much each participant knew about mental 
retardation prior to completing the study. The BDQ required participants to list the 
necessary criteria to establish a diagnosis of mental retardation. The BDQ also required 
participants to indicate whether they had personal knowledge or experience with people 
with mental retardation (See Appendix F). 
After completing the pre-evaluation forms, all participants were asked to 
complete a number of standardized assessments. In completing these assessments, the 
participants were asked to follow the general instructions requiring them to either 
complete the assessments as well as they could, or to complete the assessments as if they 
had mental retardation.  The first standardized assessment in the packet was The Shipley 
Institute of Living Scale, Second Edition (SILS-2).  This assessment served as a measure 
of intellectual functioning, which is an essential component of any evaluation examining 
mental retardation.  The SILS-2 consists of a verbal measure of intelligence, vocabulary, 
and a nonverbal measure of intelligence, abstraction.  The Vocabulary subtest measures 
an individual’s crystallized ability whereas the Abstraction subtest measures an 
individual’s fluid cognitive ability (Shipley, 2009).   
The participants were also asked to complete an adaptive behavior assessment, 
since adaptive behavior is another essential component of mental retardation evaluation 
69 
 
(Harrison & Oakland, 2003). The Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second 
Edition (ABAS-II) served as the adaptive behavior assessment measure for this study.  
The ABAS-II is a comprehensive adaptive behavior assessment tool that can be used with 
adults, and can be based on self-report (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  The ABAS-II 
measures three main domains of everyday functioning: Conceptual, Social, and Practical. 
These domains encompass practical, everyday skills required to function, meet 
environmental demands, care for oneself, and interact with others effectively and 
independently. The Conceptual, Social, and Practical domains are combined to yield an 
overall Global Adaptive Composite (GAC) for an individual (Harrison & Oakland, 
2003).   
The final assessment tool the participants were asked to complete was the 
Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition, Self-Report of Personality 
(BASC-2).  The specific form used in this study was designed to be used with people 18 
to 25 years old. On the BASC-2, participants were expected to respond themselves. The 
BASC-2 was created with built-in validity indicators used to detect the validity of the 
examinees responses.  The BASC-2 validity scales can assist examiners in identifying 
exaggerated responding, as well as other inaccurate depictions of an individual’s 
behavior.  Here, the BASC-2 was used both as a secondary measure of adult level 
adaptive behavior skills, as well as a tool to determine the validity of responses. The 
items making up the adaptive behavior scores assessed on the BASC-2 are scattered 
throughout the entire questionnaire, thus making it a lot more difficult for the participants 
to be able to detect which items are relevant to the construct of adaptive behavior.  In 
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addition, the validity indicators further serve to assist in detecting unusual or invalid 
response patterns (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). 
Each of the assessment tools utilized in this study was used for the specific 
purpose of informing the research questions posed by the study.  The specific research 
questions were as follows: 
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on intelligence scores obtained from 
the SILS-2?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on total adaptive behavior scores 
obtained from the ABAS-II?  
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group on adaptive behavior scores obtained 
from the BASC-2? 
 Are there significant differences between the control group, the malingering 
group, and the informed-malingering group with regards to how well participants 
are able to provide responses on the BASC-2 that go undetected by the built-in 
validity scales?   
Ten hypotheses were tested to address the four general research questions: 
1. There will be a statistically significant difference in SILS-2 total, verbal, and 
nonverbal intelligence test scores between the control group and the combined 
malingering groups. 
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2. The difference between SILS-2 total, verbal, and nonverbal intelligence test 
scores of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups will not be 
statistically significant.   
3. There will be a statistically significant difference in the ABAS-II GAC test scores 
between the control group and the combined malingering groups. 
4. The difference between the ABAS-II GAC test scores of the malingering and the 
informed-malingering groups will not be statistically significant. 
5. There will be a statistically significant difference in the BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment test scores between the control group and the combined malingering 
groups. 
6. The difference between the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment test scores of the 
malingering and the informed-malingering groups will not be statistically 
significant. 
7. There will be a statistically significant difference in the number of “acceptable” 
ratings on the BASC-2 validity indicators between the control group and the 
combined malingering groups.  
8. The difference in the number of “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 validity 
indicators test scores of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups will 
not be statistically significant. 
9. There will be no statistically significant difference in performance of the 
participants assigned to a malingering condition on measures in this study 
contingent on prior diagnostic knowledge about mental retardation. 
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10. There will be no statistically significant difference between performance of the 
participants assigned to a malingering condition on measures in this study 
contingent on prior personal knowledge or experience with persons with mental 
retardation. 
Demographics and Screening of the Participants 
 The initial step in this analysis was the researcher input of all data into SPSS for 
review and descriptive statistical analysis.  An initial screening to identify apparently 
invalid data sets before proceeding with detailed analysis is typical (Jones, Loe, Krach, 
Rager, & Jones, 2008) and may be particularly important in studies using subject pool 
participants because of motivational concerns. 
 An anomaly was immediately evident in the standard deviation of SILS-2 total 
scores in the malingering group.  The SPSS stem and leaf method, recommended as a 
tool to identify outliers in a data set was employed; two cases were clearly identified by 
this method and were removed from further data analysis. Analysis continued with the 
remaining 68 participants.   
The researcher input all the participants’ demographic information into SPSS for 
descriptive statistical analysis.  The descriptive data was analyzed with the data from all 
68 participants.   A total of 44 participants (65%) were female and 24 (35%) were male.  
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 59 with a mean age of 27 at the time of this study.  
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 Participants’ undergraduate majors were as follows: approximately 41% of the 
sample were Education majors (N = 28), slightly under 8% were Special Education 
majors (N = 5), about 16% were Psychology majors (N = 11), about 10% were Political 
Science and/or History majors (N = 7), nearly 9% were Fine Arts majors (N = 6), 6% 
were majoring in Math or Science (N = 4), and the final 10% had majors in academic 
fields other than the fields already listed (N = 7). Of the participants, only one was 
working on dual degrees.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequencies of participant gender by condition 
 Group Condition Total 
CG MG IM 
Gender 
Male 
Count 5 7 12 24 
% of 
Total 
7% 10% 18% 35% 
Female 
Count 18 16 10 44 
% of 
Total 
27% 23% 15% 65% 
Total 
Count 23 23 22 68 
% of 
Total 
34% 34% 32% 100% 
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Frequencies of participant majors by condition 
 Group Condition Total 
CG MG IM 
Major 
Education 
Count 12 8 8 28 
% of 
Total 
17.6% 11.8% 11.8% 41.2% 
Special 
Education 
Count 0 3 2 5 
% of 
Total 
0% 4.4% 3% 7.4% 
Psychology 
Count 4 4 3 11 
% of 
Total 
6% 6% 4.4% 16.4% 
Political 
Science/History 
Count 3 3 1 7 
% of 
Total 
4.4% 4.4% 1.5% 10.3% 
Fine Arts 
Count 2 1 3 6 
% of 
Total 
3% 1.5% 4.4% 8.9% 
Math/Science 
Count 1 1 2 4 
% of 
Total 
1.5% 1.5% 3% 6% 
Other 
Count 1 3 3 7 
% of 
Total 
1.5% 4.4% 4.4% 10.3% 
Total 
Count 23 23 22 68 
% of 
Total 
34% 34% 32% 100% 
 
The participants’ responses on the first question presented on the Baseline Data 
Questionnaire (BDQ) were examined (Appendix F).  None of the participants surveyed 
could correctly identify all three necessary components of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA’s) definition of mental retardation.  A total of 33 participants (48%) 
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were able to identify two components of the definition, a total of 29 participants (43%) 
were able to identify one component of the definition, and a total of six participants (9%) 
could not indicate any of the necessary components of the APA’s definition of mental 
retardation.  The most common component identified by participants was the IQ 
component.  No participants were able to identify the age-of-onset criteria for the 
condition. A Pearson’s Chi-square test found that there were not statistically significant 
differences in prior diagnostic knowledge among the three groups,            
            . 
Frequencies reflecting participants’ prior knowledge of diagnostic criteria 
 Group Condition Total 
CG MG IM 
Diagnostic 
Criteria  
zero criteria 
Count 3 1 2 6 
% of 
Total 
4% 1% 2% 7% 
one 
criterion 
Count 10 9 10 29 
% of 
Total 
15% 13% 15% 43% 
two criteria 
Count 10 13 10 33 
% of 
Total 
15% 20% 15% 50% 
Total 
Count 23 23 22 68 
% of 
Total 
34% 34% 32% 100.0% 
 
The participant’s responses on the BDQ’s second question were also examined.  
A total of 37 participants (54%) indicated that they did not have prior personal experience 
with someone with mental retardation.  A total of 31 (46%) participants indicated that 
they did, in fact, have prior personal experience with someone with mental retardation. A 
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Pearson’s Chi-square test found that there were not statistically significant differences in 
prior personal experience with people with mental retardation among the three groups 
                        . 
Frequencies reflecting participants who did and did not have prior 
experience with Mental Retardation 
 Group Condition Total 
CG MG IM 
Experience 
No 
Count 15 9 13 37 
% of 
Total 
22% 13% 19% 54% 
Yes 
Count 8 14 9 31 
% of 
Total 
12% 21% 13% 46% 
Total 
Count 23 23 22 68 
% of 
Total 
34% 34% 32% 100.0% 
 
 The data analysis used in this study was comprised of descriptive and inferential 
statistics.   Each of these analyses was conducted in SPSS Version 20 statistical program. 
Hypothesis 1 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the performance 
of the control group and the combined malingering groups on the SILS-2.  As 
hypothesized, there was a marked difference between the mean SILS-2 total score of the 
control group (M = 112.5) and the mean SILS-2 total score of the combined malingering 
group (M = 44.6); a one-tailed significance test indicated that the difference was 
statistically significant, F(1,66) = 607.71, p = .0000.  The effect size (Partial Eta Squared) 
was large, .902.  Performance of the control group on this instrument was at the level 
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expected on the SILS-2, suggesting that the instrument was appropriate for participants in 
this study.  
The SILS-2 total score is made up of two distinct subtests that measure specific 
cognitive skills and utilize different cognitive capacities of the person taking the test.  
The first subtest, the Vocabulary subtest, was verbal in nature.  The Vocabulary subtest 
was constructed to measure a person’s crystallized ability, which is knowledge that a 
person accumulates through experience and education (Shipley, 2009). The second 
subtest, the Abstraction subtest, was nonverbal in nature and primarily measured fluid 
ability.  Fluid ability is the ability to use logic to solve novel problems and take in new 
information (Shipley, 2009).    
In this sample, a pattern comparable to the finding with the SILS-2 total score was 
evident in analysis of the performance on the subtests by the control and combined 
malingering groups.  The verbal subtest mean score for the control group (109.0) was 
well above the mean for the malingering groups (48.5).  The difference with a one-tailed 
significance test, was statistically significant, F(1,66) = 613.33, p = .0000; the effect size 
(.903) was large. 
The pattern continued in comparison of performance on the SILS-2 nonverbal 
subtest.  Mean scores for the control group and combined malingering groups were 111.3 
and 55.3, respectively.  The difference was statistically significant, F(1,66) = 317.33,  p = 
.0000 with a large effect size, .828. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Of particular interest was examination of differences in performance on the 
experimental measures by the groups who were informed, the informed-malingering 
group, and were not informed, the malingering group, in this study about characteristics 
of persons with mental retardation.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted 
with SILS-2 scores to compare the performance.  The difference in mean SILS-2 total 
scores for the malingering group (43.4) and the informed-malingering group (45.9) was 
not statistically significant, F(1,43) = .522, p = .474. The effect size, .012, was small. 
No evident effect of instructions for feigning mental retardation was evident in 
comparison of scores on the SILS-2 verbal and on SILS-2 nonverbal scores, as well.  
Mean SILS-2 verbal scores for the malingering group and informed-malingering group 
were 47.9 and 49.1, respectively. The difference was not statistically significant, F(1,43) 
= .135, p = .715. The effect size, .0003, was negligible. 
A statistically significant difference in performance on the SILS-2 nonverbal 
subtest was also not evident with mean scores of 54.3 and 56.4 for the malingering group 
and informed-malingering groups, respectively, F(1,43) = .324, p = .572.  The effect size, 
.0007, was negligible. 
Hypothesis 3  
The next analysis compared the performance of the control group and the 
combined malingering groups on the ABAS-II GAC through a one-way between subjects 
ANOVA.  The results showed that there was a noticeable difference between the mean 
ABAS-II GAC score of the control group (M = 105.17) and the mean ABAS-II GAC 
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score of the combined malingering group (M = 50.13).  A one-tailed significance test 
indicated that, as hypothesized, the difference was statistically significant, F(1, 66) = 
218.68, p = .000.  The effect size was large, .768.  Like performance of the control group 
on the SILS-2, the performance of the control group on this instrument was also at the 
level expected for the participants on the ABAS-II. This suggests that the ABAS-II was 
appropriate for participants in this study.  
Hypothesis 4 
Next, the ABAS-II GAC scores were compared between the informed-
malingering group and the malingering group.  It was hypothesized that there would be 
no significant differences between the informed-malingering group and the malingering 
group on the ABAS-II GAC scores.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted with ABAS-II GAC scores to compare the performance.  The difference in 
mean ABAS-II GAC scores for the malingering group (52.43) and the informed 
malingering group (47.73) was not statistically significant, F(1, 43) = .1.91, p = .174. The 
effect size, .043, was small. 
Hypothesis 5 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the performance 
of the control group and the combined malingering groups on the BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment scores.  As hypothesized, there was a difference between the mean BASC-2 
Personal Adjustment score of the control group (M = 52.48) and the mean BASC-2 
Personal Adjustment score of the combined malingering group (M = 34.20).  Further, a 
one-tailed significance test indicated that the difference was statistically significant, F(1, 
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65) = 41.35, p = .000.  The effect size was large, .389.  As was the case for the SILS-2 
scores, and the ABAS-II GAC scores, performance of the control group on the BASC-2 
Personal Adjustment score was at the level expected, suggesting that the instrument was 
appropriate for participants in this study.  
Hypothesis 6 
The differences in performance on the experimental measures by the malingering 
group and informed-malingering group were examined for the BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment scores.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted with BASC-2 
Personal Adjustment scores to compare the performance.  The difference in mean BASC-
2 Personal Adjustment scores for the malingering group (35.96) and the informed-
malingering group (32.29) was not statistically significant, F(1, 42) = .1.046, p = .312. 
The effect size, .024, was small. 
Hypothesis 7 
The next analysis conducted examined whether there were clinically significant 
differences between the control group and the combined malingering groups on the 
number of cautionary validity indicators on the BASC-2. This analysis first included an 
examination of each of the five validity indicators on the BASC-2 to determine how 
many shaded indices were present for each participant.  When a validity indicator shows 
responses that are deemed to be cautionary, they are shaded in the relevant validity 
indicator boxes on the BASC-2 scoring system.  A non-shaded index, on the other hand, 
suggested that the participant’s answers were considered to be “acceptable” for that 
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particular indicator.  Since the BASC-2 has five validity indicators, each participant’s 
overall BASC-2 validity rating was given a coding of zero to five.   
The value of the overall validity score is an independent value that is ordinal in 
nature.  In other words, though the numbers can be represented in a number order, there 
is not a meaningful interval between each score.  Since the shaded cells are counted 
towards the overall validity number, the total does not account for whether the shaded 
box suggests “caution” or “extreme caution”. A score of 4 does not necessarily suggest 
that the person responded poorly on twice as many responses as a person with a score of 
two.  Given that the variable in this case is ordinal in nature, a non-parametric test was 
required.  For this reason, this data was analyzed using the Kruskal-Wallis test.   
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate differences between the control 
group and the combined malingering group on the number of non-acceptable ratings on 
the BASC-2 validity scales. The test was significant between the control group and the 
combined malingering groups,                       .  Follow-up tests 
revealed that the combined malingering group had significantly more non-acceptable 
validity indicators than the control group.  The effect size, .278, was moderate. 
Hypothesis 8 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate differences between the 
malingering group and the informed-malingering group on the number of non-acceptable 
ratings on the BASC-2 validity scales. The test was not significant between the groups, 
                      .  Follow-up tests informed-malingering group had 
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significantly more non-acceptable validity indicators than the malingering group.  The 
effect size was small, .015.   
Hypothesis 9 
For this hypothesis, further analyses were conducted to compare the effects of the 
prior diagnostic knowledge on the experimental measures used in this study.   The 
Baseline Data Questionnaire (BDQ) provided information about participants’ diagnostic 
knowledge about mental retardation prior to the participant completing this study.  The 
first question on the BDQ asked, “What are the main characteristics of mental 
retardation?”  Each participant response was scored on a scale from zero to three 
depending on the number of correct diagnostic criteria the participant listed based on the 
APA definition of mental retardation.  A score of zero would reflect that the participant 
could not correctly identify any of the correct diagnostic criteria, whereas a score of three 
would reflect that the participant was able to describe all three required criteria, including 
a cognitive component, an adaptive behavioral component, and that the manifestation of 
the condition had to be observed prior to the age of 18 years of age.  
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore whether prior diagnostic 
knowledge influenced SILS-2 total, verbal, and nonverbal scores of the malingering 
group and informed-malingering group. Results of the three analyses revealed no 
statistically significant differences on the SILS-2 total scores, F(2, 42) = .138, p = .872, 
verbal scores, F(2, 42) = .217, p = .730, or nonverbal scores,  (2, 42) = .300, p = .742.  
Effect sizes were minimal: .007, .015, and .014. 
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore whether prior diagnostic 
knowledge influenced ABAS-II GAC scores of the malingering group and informed 
malingering groups. Results of the analysis revealed no statistically significant 
differences on the ABAS-II GAC scores, F(2, 42) = .163, p = .850.  The effect size was 
minimal: .008. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore whether prior diagnostic 
knowledge influenced BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores of the malingering group and 
informed-malingering group. Results of the analysis revealed no statistically significant 
differences on the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores, F(2, 41) = 1.194, p = .313.  The 
effect size was small: .06. 
Hypothesis 10 
The second question on the BDQ asked participants, “Do you have any personal 
knowledge and/or experience with people with mental retardation? If so, describe.”  
Whereas the first item of the BDQ sought to determine whether the participants had a 
clinical or diagnostic understanding of the condition, the second question sought to 
determine whether the participants had a real-world understanding of mental retardation.  
The participants’ responses were categorized as binary, “yes”, indicating they had prior 
knowledge/experience, or “no”, indicating they did not have prior knowledge or 
experience. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore whether personal knowledge or 
prior experience with persons with mental retardation influenced SILS-2 total, verbal, 
and nonverbal scores of participants in the malingering group and informed-malingering 
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group. Results of the three analyses again revealed no statistically significant differences 
on the SILS-2 total scores, F(1, 43) = .237, p = .629 verbal scores, F (2, 42) = .217, p = 
.730, or nonverbal scores, F(1, 43) = .411, p = .525.  Effect sizes were negligible: .005, 
.000, and .009. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore whether personal knowledge or 
prior experience with persons with mental retardation influenced ABAS-II GAC scores 
of participants in the malingering group and informed-malingering group. Results of the 
three analyses again revealed no statistically significant differences on the ABAS-II GAC 
F (1, 43) = 1.305, p = .260. The effect size was small: .029. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore whether personal knowledge or 
prior experience with persons with mental retardation influenced BASC-2 Personal 
Adjustment scores of participants in the malingering group and informed malingering 
group. Results of the analysis again revealed no statistically significant differences on the 
BASC-2 Personal Adjustment score, F (1, 42) = .189, p = .666.  The effect size was 
small: .004. 
Summary 
This chapter described how the data for this study was collected, how the data 
was analyzed, and what the results of this study were. Demographic characteristics of the 
participants were also described.  Overall, this study examined whether individuals 
malingering having mental retardation could be detected using standard validity 
indicators and whether individuals provided with a definition of mental retardation were 
more effective at malingering having the condition than individuals not provided with the 
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definition.  This was examined by comparing scores on an intellectual assessment (SILS-
2), an adaptive behavior assessment (ABAS-II), and a secondary adaptive behavior 
assessment with built-in validity indicators (BASC-2).  Test scores, and quantities of 
BASC-2 validity cautions, were compared between combined malingering groups and the 
control group.  Similarly, the malingering group and the informed-malingering group 
scores and validity cautions were compared.  Finally, scores were compared using prior 
diagnostic knowledge and prior personal knowledge as the independent variables.  
As hypothesized, statistically significant differences in SILS-2 intelligence test 
scores, ABAS-II GAC scores, and BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores between the 
control group and the combined malingering groups were observed.  Also, as expected, 
the difference between SILS-2 intelligence test scores, ABAS-II GAC scores, and BASC-
2 Personal Adjustment scores of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups 
were not statistically significant.  Further, as hypothesized, there was a statistically 
significant difference in the number of “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 validity 
indicators between the control group and the combined malingering groups. Also, as 
hypothesized, statistically significant differences in the number of “acceptable” ratings on 
the BASC-2 validity indicators of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups 
were not statistically significant. 
Finally, results indicated that there were no statistically significant differences in 
any of the scores as a result of the level of participants’ prior diagnostic knowledge of 
mental retardation. A similar analysis was conducted using prior experiential knowledge 
as the independent variable. Results of that analysis revealed that there were no 
statistically significant differences in any of the scores as a result of participants’ prior 
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experiential knowledge of mental retardation.  There were not statically significant 
differences in SILS-2, ABAS-II GAC, or BASC-2 Personal Adjustment scores between 
those who had prior diagnostic knowledge or experiential knowledge and those who did 
not.  
  
87 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
Introduction 
When the United States Supreme Court determined that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional in relation to capital defendants with mental retardation, Justice Antonin 
Scalia argued, “One need only read the definitions of mental retardation adopted by the 
American Association of Mental Retardation and the American Psychological 
Association to realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned” (Atkins 
v. Virginia, 2002, p. 353). The present study examined whether this statement was 
warranted given the sophistication of the psychological assessments and the 
sophistication of forensic examiners. This study examined whether laypersons with the 
clinical definition of mental retardation were more effective at malingering having the 
condition than laypersons without the definition.    
A diagnosis of mental retardation requires onset of the disability prior to the age 
of 18 years of age, significant deficits in intellectual functioning, and significant deficits 
in adaptive behavior (APA, 2000). Theoretical and practical research on intelligence 
enjoys a long history and extensive examination.  Detecting malingering through the 
administration and interpretation of cognitive assessments is common practice in the 
Atkins context (Doane & Salekin, 2009).  Though theoretical and practical research has 
been conducted examining adaptive behavior, it tends to be less understood by the 
general population than the construct of intelligence. Likewise, adaptive behavior is not a 
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construct that has traditionally been the focus of forensic investigation in the Atkins 
context.  Since adaptive behavior assessment is essential in determining mental 
retardation, it is also an area that may be potentially impacted by malingering when it 
comes to Atkins evaluations.  Since adaptive behavior is not well understood, it is not 
clear how easy it would be to manipulate having deficits in this area.  
Research Questions 
The overall question presented in this study was whether individuals provided 
with a definition of mental retardation are more effective at malingering having the 
condition than individuals not provided with the definition.  For this reason, participants 
were provided with an intellectual assessment, as well as adaptive behavior assessments. 
Having the participants complete an intellectual assessment allowed the researcher to 
establish whether there were significant differences between the control group, the 
malingering group, and the informed-malingering group on intelligence scores obtained 
from the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Second Edition (SILS-2). 
The completion of an intellectual assessment was necessary to answer the general 
research question.  However, having the participants complete an intellectual assessment 
also served to prevent the participants from realizing that the specific purpose of this 
study was to focus on the adaptive behavior component of mental retardation.  In the 
Atkins context, malingerers would have to first determine which assessment tools are 
seeking to measure adaptive behavior and what responses would be required to 
effectively feign deficits in this area to a level that is consistent with mild mental 
retardation. This study examined whether there were any significant differences between 
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the control group, the malingering group, and the informed-malingering group on the 
adaptive behavior scores obtained from the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, 
Second Edition’s (ABAS-II) Global Adaptive Composite (GAC), as well as the 
Behavioral Assessment System for Children, Second Edition’s (BASC-2) Personal 
Adjustment scores. 
Though the ABAS-II and the BASC-2 both measure adaptive behavior, the format 
of each differs in significant ways.  Whereas the BASC-2 is a comprehensive measure of 
adaptive behavior functioning, the ABAS-II contains various social and emotional 
subscales that are not necessarily related to adaptive behavior (Harrison & Oakland, 
2003).  The BASC-2 yields a Personal Adjustment scale, which is a measure of adaptive 
behavior. The items that load into this scale are scattered throughout the entire 
assessment among items that load into other scales.  It is not easy for responders to 
identify which questions are relevant to the adaptive behavior scale and which ones are 
not.  Finally, the BASC-2 contains built in validity indicators that serve to identify 
atypical patterns of responses.  This further indentified whether the responder is 
answering the questions in a valid fashion.  In addition to the other areas of inquiry, this 
study also sought to determine whether there were significant differences between the 
control group, the malingering group, and the informed-malingering group with regards 
to how well participants were able to provide responses on the BASC-2 that go 
undetected by the built-in validity scales.  
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Summary of Findings 
Based on the research questions, ten hypotheses were specified and tested.  As 
hypothesized, statistically significant differences in SILS-2 intelligence test scores 
between the control group and the combined malingering groups were observed.  Also, as 
expected, the difference between SILS-2 total, verbal, and nonverbal intelligence test 
scores of the malingering and the informed-malingering groups were not statistically 
significant.   
As was the case with the SILS-2 test scores, there was also a statistically 
significant difference in the ABAS-II GAC test scores between the control group and the 
combined malingering groups, but the difference in GAC scores between the malingering 
group and the informed-malingering group was not statistically significant.  Similarly, 
there was a statistically significant difference in the BASC-2 Personal Adjustment test 
scores between the control group and the combined malingering groups, but not between 
the malingering group and the informed-malingering group. 
The malingering group and the informed-malingering group both had mean 
intelligence scores and adaptive behavior scores below a standard score of 70, which 
would be indicative of mental retardation.  However, the mean scores were so low that 
they would normally be seen in individuals with moderate mental retardation rather than 
mild mental retardation.  If an individual actually had moderate mental retardation, the 
disability would affect the person’s communication and abilities to such a degree that the 
condition would have most likely already been identified. If the condition had not already 
been identified, it is highly unlikely that the individual with moderate mental retardation 
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would be able to read the items on the assessments in this study. For that reason, the low 
scores obtained on these assessments by both malingering groups would immediately 
raise suspicion by a forensic examiner.  
In addition to examining the score differences between the different groups, 
validity indicators on the BASC-2 were also inspected. It was hypothesized that the 
control group would have more valid response patterns on the BASC-2 than the 
combined malingering groups as evidenced by the number of validity indicators in the 
“acceptable” range. As hypothesized, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
number of “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 validity indicators between the control 
group and the combined malingering groups. Also, as hypothesized, difference in the 
number of “acceptable” ratings on the BASC-2 validity indicators of the malingering and 
the informed-malingering groups was not statistically significant. 
Prior knowledge of mental retardation was determined for each participant from 
their responses on the Baseline Data Questionnaire (BDQ), both in terms of diagnostic 
knowledge and personal knowledge.  SILS-2 scores, ABAS-II GAC scores, and BASC-2 
Personal Adjustment scores were compared using prior diagnostic knowledge as the 
independent variable. Results indicated that there were no statistically significant 
differences in any of the scores as a result of the level of participants’ prior diagnostic 
knowledge of mental retardation. A similar analysis was conducted using prior 
experiential knowledge as the independent variable. Results of that analysis revealed that 
there were no statistically significant differences in any of the scores as a result of 
participants’ prior experiential knowledge of mental retardation.  In other words, there 
were not statically significant differences in SILS-2, ABAS-II, or BASC-2 scores 
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between those who had prior diagnostic knowledge or experiential knowledge and those 
who did not.  
Implications  
 These results suggest that it is not easy to malinger having mental retardation.  In 
order to successfully malinger having the condition, it is not enough to depress scores on 
an intelligence assessment. Rather, individuals also must answer enough items correctly 
on an intelligence test to ensure they receive standard scores in the range of standard 
score of about 55 to 70.   
Adaptive behavior, specifically, is a construct not completely understood, and 
may be an area that is particularly difficult to assess in a forensic context.  On the other 
hand, the complex nature of adaptive behavior may serve as an advantage to an evaluator 
in the Atkins contexts for this same reason.   Assessment tools with built-in validity 
indicators, such as those used on the BASC-2, may prove to be especially helpful when 
establishing the respondent’s veracity. In addition, multiple raters should be used when 
trying to make such a determination.   
 Just as a psychologist should not act as an authority figure on legal issues unless 
he has particular area of recognized expertise, it is important that those in the legal 
community refrain from doing the same with information beyond the scope of their own 
expertise.  Supreme Court Justices, lawyers, judges, and policy makers should avoid 
making unwarranted claims about psychological constructs and diagnoses unless they are 
qualified to do so.  Statements, such as the one made by Justice Scalia in this case, hold a 
lot of weight with readers, juries, and other decision makers. Many of these claims go 
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unquestioned, and may cause the listener to make decisions based on these faulty claims.  
In the case of capital punishment, society cannot afford to let these claims go unchecked.  
Incorrect understanding or lack of understanding by an influential person who enjoys 
extensive channels of communication to the public can lead to devastating consequences. 
Limitations and Alterative Explanations 
Despite the promising results obtained in this study, there is always a chance that 
the results were obtained for reasons other than the central conclusions being drawn by 
the researcher. Such alternative explanations are related to limitations of the present 
study.  In this study, the researcher based the main conclusions on certain assumptions. 
For instance, it was assumed that the participants read and comprehended the material 
given to them. It was assumed that the participants were motivated to complete the study 
and that they also put forth adequate effort.  It was assumed that the scope of the 
assessment was adequate to answer the research questions, and that the time allotted for 
the participants to complete the assessments was adequate.  
Motivation, effort, and comprehension. 
If, but for a person being found as having mental retardation, he would receive the 
death penalty, the motivation to successfully malinger having the condition would be 
very high. Such motivation would likely cause the person to conduct extensive research 
on what mental retardation is in order to better understand how to present with the same 
characteristics in front of a forensic psychologist.  In the present study, the motivation for 
those participants in the malingering conditions to present as having mental retardation 
cannot be considered equivalent to the motivation assumed to be present in the real life 
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situation.  There was a general motivational factor for the participants in that they would 
receive class credit if they participated in the study. There may also have been intrinsic 
motivation for the participants to successfully malinger the condition in order to prove to 
the researcher that they could beat the test. However, any motivation by the participants 
to successfully malinger on these assessments can be assumed to be far less than the 
motivation of a real capital defendant making an Atkins claim.  For this reason the 
mismatch of motivation between the sample and the population the results are supposed 
to generalize to is the biggest limitation in this study. 
Related to the issue of motivation is effort. The amount of effort a participant puts 
forth is presumed to have a strong positive correlation to the amount of motivation they 
have to actually attempt to malinger having mental retardation.  It has already been 
determined that the mean intelligence and adaptive behaviors scores for the malingering 
groups were extremely low and in the range representative of moderate mental 
retardation.  It is possible that the participants in the malingering conditions read the 
instructions, understood that they were expected to get low scores on the assessments in 
order to appear mentally retarded, and erroneously believed that they did not have to 
answer the questions with any effort.  In actuality, in order to successfully malinger on 
these assessments, it would be essential that the participants put forth the effort in not just 
answering the questions quickly and randomly, but taking the time to strategically answer 
some questions correctly in order to obtain scores within the range of mild mental 
retardation.  
Another potential limitation in how the participants completed the assigned task 
was the study did not provide for a way for participants to indicate that they took the time 
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to read and try to comprehend the meaning of the definitions provided.  If a capital 
defendant wanted to malinger having this condition, it is assumed that he would make 
every effort possible to read and understand what it meant to be mentally retarded. Such 
understanding was assumed in this study, but in actuality, there was not any verifiable 
proof that the participants in the informed-malingering group actually read and 
understood the definitions. 
Characteristics of the sample. 
Data from a total of 68 participants were used for the current study. In order for 
the results of this study to generalize to the target population, additional studies with 
more participants need to be conducted.  The results of the current study provided 
preliminary information about the difficulty in attempting to malinger having mental 
retardation, but the effect sizes in some of the analyses were not large enough to 
conclusively determine that the observed differences were the result of the different 
instructions. Rather, it is possible, particularly in the analyses yielding small effect sizes, 
that any observed differences were the result of chance rather than the differences in 
instructions the groups received.  Conducting future studies with increased sample sizes 
is one way to address this issue.  Another way to address this issue is to choose 
instruments that are more sensitive to detecting differences between those participants 
answering the questions correctly versus those participants who are attempting to feign 
deficits. 
The sample recruited for the present research was bound by limitations inherent in 
the nature of the research.  Though this sample provided various benefits, such as 
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accessibility, convenience, and fluent abilities to read and comprehend the materials they 
were provided, the sample was not representative of a forensic population. Though a 
forensic sample would have likely allowed for better generalizability to the target 
population, accessing such participants was not feasible for this study.  
Limitations of assessment. 
There were specific limitations with each of the individual instruments chosen for 
this study. The Shipley-2 is an intellectual screener that allowed for group administration. 
For the purposes of this study, it was convenient. However, it is a screening instrument 
that appears to have a high basal and a low ceiling.  Though the ABAS-II is a 
comprehensive assessment of adaptive behavior, it also appears to have a high basal and 
a low ceiling. Further, the arrangement of the items in each subsection makes it obvious 
that the skills are ordered from easiest to most difficult. The BASC-2, on the other hand, 
has the adaptive behavior items mixed in with other items so as to not make it obvious 
what the tool is attempting to measure.  Further, there are built-in validity indicators that 
provide immediate determination of atypical response patterns. For the purposes of an 
Atkins evaluation, this type of instrument may appear particularly useful.  However, the 
BASC-2 also has its own limitations. For instance, the particular BASC-2 used in this 
study is has norms for college students which would not be relevant for most capital 
defendants. Also, the BASC-2 only has norms for people up to the age of 25 years, 11 
months.  Older individuals would not be able to be legitimately compared to the norms 
available.  Finally, the BASC-2 does not provide a comprehensive measure of adaptive 
behavior. Though it is often used to supplement, or add to, other information, it is 
generally not useful as an adaptive behavior tool by itself.  
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Recommendations for Future Research 
The current study provides preliminary information for future research to easily 
build upon. Future research may want to strengthen the areas identified as limitations in 
the present study. Additional studies should allow for more incentives to increase the 
motivation of participants completing the study.  Another way of addressing this would 
be for the examiner to directly measure effort. Later, the examiner can examine the 
outcomes with effort as the independent variable to determine how much of the variance 
between test scores could be due to effort rather than just the instructions they were 
given.  Likewise, future studies may want to include a task that measures how much the 
participants are actually reading and comprehending the instructions and information they 
are being provided with.   
Efforts should be made to attempt to increase the sample size and utilize a sample 
more consistent with the target population being studied.  There are arguable benefits to 
using college educated students for such studies, and the information obtained from these 
studies is relevant even though the sample is not necessarily similar to the target 
population. If college educated students are not able to successfully malinger, it would be 
presumably more difficult for a forensic population to successfully malinger having the 
condition.  Even so, it would be informative to examine the results of a study similar to 
the present study with forensic participants.  Such a study may increase the 
generalizability of the results to the larger population of capital defendants.   
Researchers examining this issue in the future may want to use assessments most 
commonly used in a forensic context, including more comprehensive measures of 
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intelligence and adaptive behavior. Multiple raters should be used for the adaptive 
behavior scales rather than just relying on a self-report. It would be informative to 
determine whether family members provided with information about mental retardation 
could feign responses to make it appear as though a target individual had adaptive 
behavior deficits. The closer the scope of assessment in the research replicates the scope 
of assessment actually used in an Atkins context, the stronger the external validity will 
be. 
Finally, in the present study, participants were only given the definition of mental 
retardation and the definition of adaptive behavior. If someone were actually attempting 
to malinger having mental retardation for the purpose of avoiding capital punishment, it 
is likely that they would conduct much more thorough research about what mental 
retardation is. Though the purposes of this study only included definitions for the sake of 
examining Justice Scalia’s specific claim, future studies should examine whether 
participants would be better able to malinger having the condition if they had more 
extensive information about the condition itself.  It seems unlikely that an understanding 
about the condition would translate into participants being better able to know how to 
malinger on sophisticated psychological assessments, but such research may nonetheless 
be informative. 
Implication for School Psychology 
Individuals with mental retardation are generally evaluated through local, state, or 
federal agencies.  Characteristics associated with moderate, severe, and profound levels 
of mental retardation are often so atypical that children with mental retardation at these 
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levels are often identified prior to reaching elementary school.  However, since 
characteristics of mild mental retardation tend to be more subtle than the other three types 
of mental retardation, children with these deficits may not be identified until later.  
Individuals with mental retardation are sometimes misidentified as having other disabling 
conditions, or sometimes they are not identified as having any disabling condition at all.  
School psychologists are on the forefront of identifying children with various 
disabling conditions, including mental retardation.  School psychologists are charged 
with conducting comprehensive evaluations examining each of the areas associated with 
mental retardation.  It is crucial that school psychologists identify children with mental 
retardation accurately.  School psychologists must not avoid using the mental retardation 
label when a child’s psycho-educational profile is indicative of that condition.  Likewise, 
school psychologists must also be aware of various threats to validity, including 
malingering.   
School psychologists may not realize how important it is to accurately assess and 
identify disabilities such as mental retardation.  In situations where a person up for the 
death penalty makes an Atkins claim, the examiner will conduct assessments related to 
the criminal’s current intellectual and adaptive behavior functioning.  In addition, the 
examiner must show that the onset of the disability occurred prior to age 18.  Absent a 
diagnosis of mental retardation, school records become the most crucial pieces of 
information to show that such delays were present prior to the age of 18.  
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APPENDIX A 
Control Group Instructions: 
  Please complete each questionnaire as honestly as you can. Please put forth 
your best attention and effort throughout this process.  Follow the instructions written at 
the beginning of each form in your packet.  If you have any questions, please ask the 
researcher. Thank you.  
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APPENDIX B 
Malingering Group Instructions: 
Background information: 
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that execution of individuals with mental retardation 
was a cruel and unusual punishment, thus making execution of the mentally retarded 
unconstitutional and illegal in the United States of America.  Currently, many individuals 
accused and convicted of capital crimes are undergoing assessments to determine if 
they are indeed mentally retarded and, if so, are ineligible for the death penalty. 
 Specific Instructions: 
For the purpose of this study, pretend that you have been accused and convicted of a 
capital crime.  The court has ordered a psychological assessment to determine if you 
have mental retardation.  The court’s psychologist has asked you to complete various 
psychological tests today to help make this determination.  Your job is to complete 
these tests in a manner that makes you appear mentally retarded.  If you succeed in 
fooling the court’s psychologist, your life will be spared. 
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APPENDIX C 
Informed-malingering Group Instructions: 
Background information: 
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to administer the death 
penalty to convicted criminals with mental retardation.  Execution of individuals with 
mental retardation was considered a cruel and unusual punishment, thus making 
execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional and illegal in the United States of 
America.  Currently, many individuals accused and convicted of capital crimes are 
undergoing assessments to determine if they are indeed mentally retarded and, if so, are 
ineligible for the death penalty.   
 Specific Instructions: 
For the purpose of this study, pretend that you have been accused and convicted of a 
capital crime.  The court has ordered a psychological assessment to determine if you 
have mental retardation.  The court’s psychologist has asked you to complete various 
psychological tests today to help make this determination.  Your job is to complete 
these tests in a manner that makes you appear mentally retarded.  If you succeed in 
fooling the court’s psychologist, your life will be spared. 
 Resources: 
You have been provided with the current definitions of mental retardation and adaptive 
functioning.  Please feel free to refer to these definitions and the instructions on each 
task any time during the study.  If you have questions about the tasks, please ask the 
researcher.  If not, or if all your questions have been answered, please begin. 
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APPENDIX D 
Definitions for Informed-malingering Group: 
The following includes definitions of mental retardation and adaptive behavior.  
You may refer back to these definitions at any time throughout the assessment. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA)’s Definition of Mental Retardation 
Diagnostic criteria for mental retardation: 
A. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning; an IQ of approximately 70 or 
below on an individually administered IQ test (for infants, a clinical judgment of 
significantly sub-average intellectual functioning). 
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e. person’s 
effectiveness sin meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her 
cultural group) in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, 
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. 
C. The onset is before age 18 years. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA)’s Definition of Adaptive Functioning 
Adaptive functioning refers to how effectively individuals cope with common life 
demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence expected of 
someone of their particular age group, socio-cultural background, and community 
setting. 
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APPENDIX E 
Demographic Survey administered to all participants: 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. What is your gender?  (circle one)  MALE      FEMALE 
 
2. How old are you?  ________ 
 
3. What was/is your undergraduate major?  ________ 
 
4. What is your approximate Grade Point Average?  ________ 
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APPENDIX F 
Baseline Definition Questionnaire: 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1.  What are the main characteristics of mental retardation? 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you have any personal knowledge and/or experience with people with 
mental retardation?  If so, please describe. 
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APPENDIX G 
Instructions given to all participants: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Each of you has a packet containing instructions and various tasks to complete.  Please 
read all instructions and complete the tasks you are instructed to do.  Please complete 
the tasks in the order they are placed in your packets.  Let me know if you have any 
questions.  Thank you for your participation in this study. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Social/Behavioral IRB – Exempt Review 
Deemed Exempt 
 
DATE:  July 5, 2011 
 
TO:  Dr. Paul Jones, Educational Psychology  
 
FROM: Office of Research Integrity – Human Subjects 
   
RE:  Notification of review by /Lori Olafson/Dr. Lori Olafson, Co-Chair 
 Protocol Title: Adaptive Behavior Malingering in Legal Claims of 
Mental Retardation 
Protocol # 1106-3837 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This memorandum is notification that the project referenced above has been reviewed as 
indicated in Federal regulatory statutes 45CFR46 and deemed exempt under 
45 CFR 46.101(b)2. 
 
PLEASE NOTE:   
Upon Approval, the research team is responsible for conducting the research as stated in 
the exempt application reviewed by the ORI – HS and/or the IRB which shall include 
using the most recently submitted Informed Consent/Assent Forms (Information Sheet) 
and recruitment materials. The official versions of these forms are indicated by footer 
which contains the date exempted. 
 
Any changes to the application may cause this project to require a different level of IRB 
review.  Should any changes need to be made, please submit a Modification Form.  
When the above-referenced project has been completed, please submit a Continuing 
Review/Progress Completion report to notify ORI – HS of its closure. 
 
If you have questions or require any assistance, please contact the Office of Research 
Integrity - Human Subjects at IRB@unlv.edu or call 895-2794. 
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APPENDIX I 
DESCRIPTION OF ASSESSMENTS 
 
Information about the Shipley-2 
The Shipley-2 provides a quick estimate crystallized abilities, fluid abilities, and 
overall cognitive ability. Brief and easily administered to individuals or groups, it is well 
suited to many applications (i.e. when you need to obtain quick ability estimates, screen 
for cognitive dysfunction, or qualify participants for research studies). Yet it also 
functions well as a component of more complex assessments in neuropsychological, 
clinical, and forensic settings. To measure crystallized ability, the Shipley-2 includes a 
40-item Vocabulary scale. Each item requires the respondent to look at a target word and 
then choose from four options the word that is closest in meaning. To assess fluid ability, 
the Shipley-2 includes 25 sequence-completion items similar to those in the original The 
Shipley-2 can be administered in just 20 to 25 minutes.  
 
SILS-2 Vocabulary 
Instructions: 
Circle the word that has the same meaning as the one written in capital letters.  If you 
want to change an answer, draw an X through your first answer and then circle your new 
choice.  Please press hard when marking your responses. 
Example item: 
1. LARGE…………….red……………big…………….silent…………wet  
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SILS-2 Abstraction 
Instructions: 
Fill in the missing letter, number, or word to complete each sequence.  Write only one 
character in each blank space.  Please press hard when marking your responses. 
Example item:  
(Examinee is expected to fill in the blank with the correct answer):  
1. Big little high low cold _______  
 
Information about the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, 2nd Edition 
The ABAS-II assesses adaptive behavior in individuals from birth to 89 years of 
age. The ABAS-II measures daily living skills for people with varying disabilities or 
suspected disabilities. The ABAS-II measures three main domains of functioning: 
Conceptual, Social, and Practical. These domains encompass practical, everyday skills 
required to function, meet environmental demands, care for oneself, and interact with 
others effectively and independently. The ABAS-II is compatible with state and federal 
special education classification systems, and it covers the 10 adaptive skills specified in 
the DSM-IV-TR. The Adult Form can function as a self-rating. The ABAS-II requires 
just 15 to 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Basic Instructions:   
Rate yourself according to how often y0ou correctly perform a behavior, without help, 
when the behavior needs to be displayed.  The rating you choose should reflect the 
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frequency with which you perform the behavior without help, when it is needed.  Record 
your response for each item by circling one of the following: 
0:  IS NOT ABLE 
1: NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER WHEN NEEDED 
2: SOMETIMES WHEN NEEDED 
3: ALWAYS OR ALMOST ALWAYS WHEN NEEDED  
Example Item: Conceptual  
4. (Communication) Uses sentences with a noun and a verb.  
Frequency: 0 (not able); 1 (never when needed); 2 (sometimes when needed); 3 always 
when needed  
Example Item: Social  
1. (Leisure) Waits for his/her turn in games and other fun activities.  
Frequency: 0 (not able); 1 (never when needed); 2 (sometimes when needed); 3 always 
when needed  
Example Item: Practical  
1. (Self-Care) Puts shoes on correct feet.  
Frequency: 0 (not able); 1 (never when needed); 2 (sometimes when needed); 3 always 
when needed 
Information about the Behavior Assessment System for Children, 2nd Edition 
The BASC-2 Self-Report of Personality (SRP) is a comprehensive rating scale 
created to help understand the behaviors and emotions of adults. BASC-2 provides rating 
scales that measure areas important for both IDEA and DSM-IV classifications. In 
addition, BASC-2 is respected for its developmental sensitivity. The Self-Report of 
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Personality (SRP) college form (ages 18-25) provides insight into adult’s thoughts and 
feelings. Each form includes validity scales for helping judge the quality of completed 
forms. The SRP takes about 30 minutes to complete. 
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